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Abstract
The first chapter investigates the role of financial intermediation in explain-
ing the occupation choices. A large fraction of the labour force in developing
countries is own-account workers who work for themselves and have no paid
employees. This paper argues that imperfect financial intermediation drives a
wedge between the return on saving and the cost of borrowing. A larger wedge
generates a lower return on saving and a higher borrowing cost. The lower
return induces individuals with some wealth but low entrepreneurial ability to
manage their own wealth. Together with a wage fall when financial interme-
diation worsens, the model predicts higher share of own-account workers and
lower share of wage workers.
The second chapter explores the impact of One-Child Policy on human capital
and aggregate income. A quantity-quality trade-off predicts an increase in
human capital when fertility falls. The higher human capital level contributes
to aggregate output but the lower fertility reduces the size of future labour
force, hence reduces aggregate output. In a quantitative OLG model, I show
that the human capital level of children born under the strict One-child Policy
increases, but the policy’s effect on aggregate income turned negative in around
2000 due to smaller size of labour force.
The third chapter examines the effects of a decline in transaction cost of
information good. We classify industries into information sector and non-
information sector, and we classify labour into information labour and non-
information labour. We make two observations from the data. The first is the
increase in the share of information intermediate input in total intermediate
input. The second is the increase in return to information labour relative to
non-information labour. In a two sector model, We find that under reason-
able parameter assumptions, a decline in transaction cost of information good
cannot explain both facts.
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Chapter 1
Financial Intermediation and
Occupation Choice
1.1 Introduction
A large fraction of the labour force in developing countries is own-account
workers. According to International Labour Organizations (ILO), in 2013,
own-account workers accounted for about 50% of the total employment in
low income and lower-middle income countries, about 25% in upper-middle
income countries, and about 9.3% in high income countries. Own-account
workers are self-employed without employees. They are different from wage
workers in that they work for themselves and manage their own wealth. They
are different from employers in that they typically have no paid employees and
do not work with much capital.
Distinguishing between own-account workers and employers is important as
own-account workers withdraw their labour input from the market while em-
ployers actively create jobs for others. Often, studies focusing on developed
economies treat all self-employed (those with or without employees) as en-
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trepreneurs.1 In grouping both own-account workers and employers as business
owners, cross-country data implies a negative relationship between share of
business owners and per capita income (Figure 1.3), which may lead to a rather
misleading suggestion that developing countries have more entrepreneurial ac-
tivities.2 A closer look at the data reveals that the negative relationship only
holds for own-account workers. The share of employers is actually positively
correlated with income, suggesting the entrepreneurship rate is lower in devel-
oping countries (Figure 1.4b).
The main claim of this paper is that the higher share of own-account workers
in developing countries is due to imperfect financial intermediation, which
drives a wedge between return on savings and the cost of borrowing. A higher
wedge generates lower return on savings and a higher borrowing cost. The
former induces individuals with some wealth but low entrepreneurial ability to
manage their own wealth; while the later acts as a barrier to higher ability but
not so wealthy individuals to become employers. As financial intermediation
deteriorates, the share of own-account workers increases, and the share of wage
workers falls. As more individuals choose to manage wealth by themselves, the
share of capital intermediated through the market falls.
The set-up of the model in this paper differs from the standard occupation
choice models in two ways. First, I explicitly model own-account workers.
Agents with heterogeneous wealth and ability choose among becoming wage
workers, own-account workers or employers. The difference between an own-
account worker and an employer is that an own-account worker hires no paid
employees, and the difference between a wage worker and an own-account
worker is that wage workers hand all wealth to intermediaries, but an own ac-
1For example, see Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Evans and Leighton (1989) and Hamilton
(2000).
2Poschke (2015) argues that a skilled biased technology change can explain why en-
trepreneurship rates fall when productivity increases, and generates cross-country variations
in firm size distribution. His entrepreneurship rate includes both business owners with and
without employees.
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count worker can manage some wealth through investing in their own-account
business. The model also implies that the amount of capital an agent can
manage as an own-account worker is small relative to what this agent could
manage as an employer. Even the most capable agent in this model manages
relatively small amount of capital. This prediction captures the idea that own
account workers usually operate on a small scale.
The second difference is that I model financial inefficiency as the cost incurred
when intermediating capital. When the cost rises, it leads to a higher cost
of borrowing and a lower return on savings. The higher cost of borrowing
is similar to any borrowing constraint that prevents people from borrowing.
The lower return on savings, however, is a new mechanism emerging from this
model.
In the perfect financial intermediation case, the return on savings is the same
as the cost of borrowing, so wealth is irrelevant for occupation choices. Two
ability cut-offs exist. Low ability agents, those with abilities below the lower
cut-off, become wage workers. Medium ability agents, those with abilities in
between the two cut-offs, become own-account workers and high ability agents,
those with abilities higher than the higher cut-off, become employers.
When financial intermediation falls, the higher cost of borrowing and lower
return on savings distort the occupation choices. There are two channels that
increase the share of own-account workers. The first is that the lower return on
savings encourages the medium-low ability agents (at low cut-off) who have
some wealth to become own-account workers, managing small businesses to
avoid the low return. The second channel is that the higher borrowing cost
makes it expensive for medium-high ability agents (at high cut-off) to borrow to
become employers, and they become own-account workers instead. There are
also two channels that decrease the share of own-account workers. The first is
that the medium-high ability agents who have relative high wealth to abilities
17
are more likely to switch from being own-account workers to entrepreneurs,
increasing the amount of capital they manage. The second channel is that
due to the higher cost of borrowing, the medium-low ability agents who have
very low wealth are less likely to borrow to become own-account workers, and
switch to becoming wage workers.
The predictions of this model differ from a standard binary occupation choice
model in two ways. First, this model is able to quantitatively generate a large
share of self-employment, while it is difficult for models with binary occupation
choices to do so. In a binary model with wage workers and entrepreneurs, fric-
tions only affect one margin: the marginal entrepreneurs. A higher borrowing
interest rate makes borrowing expensive, so the low wealth marginal agents
become wage workers. A low return on savings induces high wealth marginal
agents to become entrepreneurs to manage wealth. As entrepreneurial ability is
relatively rare, the number of marginal agents who respond to the frictions are
quantitatively small. Hence the predicted change in share of self-employment,
entrepreneurs, is small. However, when own-account workers are explicitly
modelled, frictions can affect two margins, the medium-low ability agents and
the medium-high ability agents, as explained in the previous paragraph. The
ability and wealth needed to be own-account workers are not high, and there is
a relative abundance of medium-low ability agents. Frictions have the potential
to generate large quantitative effects on the share of self-employment.
The second important difference is that in this paper, the wealth holding of
medium-low ability agents is very important, while it is less so in binary occu-
pation choice models. In a binary model with wage workers and entrepreneurs,
the medium-low ability agents become wage workers no matter what. Their
wealth holding has no direct impact on occupation choices other than through
affecting the general equilibrium wage rate and interest rate(s). Modelling own-
account workers as a separate group, however, makes the wealth of medium-low
ability agents very important. These agents have the potential to become own-
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account workers, but whether they choose to do so will depend on how badly
their wealth income is hurt by friction and, in this case, it is the fall in return
on savings. The wealth income of an agent with zero-wealth is not affected at
all by changes in return on savings. For a given fall in return on savings, the
larger the wealth, the larger the fall in wealth income. Agents of a given abil-
ity are more likely to move from being wage workers to own-account workers
if they have higher wealth. As the amount of capital required to become an
own-account worker is small, relatively small changes in wealth holdings can
affect the occupation decision of such agents.
The strength of the four channels mentioned above depends on the wealth hold-
ing of medium-low ability agents. Thus, the effect of financial intermediation
inefficiency on the share of own-account workers depends on the joint distribu-
tion of wealth and ability, which is not directly observable. Thus, a dynamic
model with endogenous saving decision is necessary. I present such a model
with a steady state joint distribution of wealth and ability. I then calibrate the
model’s perfect intermediation case to match relevant moments in the US, and
vary the financial intermediation level to assess how well the model matches
the data. The quantitative results show that as financial intermediation falls,
borrowing interest rates increases, and saving interest rates falls. Together
with the fall of wage rate, they lead to a larger share of own-account workers
and smaller share of wage workers and employers. The calibrated model ac-
counts for more than 70% of the variation in the share of own-account workers
in the data for 2013. Furthermore, the model’s main occupation change comes
from the responses of the medium-low ability agents. The model also predicts
that as financial intermediation efficiency falls, the share of own-account work-
ers who manage their own wealth increases, leading to a lower fraction of total
capital intermediated through the market.
To summarize, this paper makes two contributions; first, I emphasize the new
channel of return on savings, which is key in generating the a large share
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of own-account workers; second, I emphasize the importance of the wealth
holdings of individuals with medium-low abilities.
The large fraction of self-employment in developing countries is well known.
Gindling and Newhouse (2014) provide a descriptive analysis. As a country de-
velops, employment moves from the agricultural sector to the non-agricultural
own-account sector and then to wage workers. De Mel et al. (2010), using
survey data on Sri Lanka, finds that 70% of own account workers share the
characteristics of wage workers, instead of employers. Gollin (2008) argues
that difference in TFP generates the cross country pattern in the share of
self-employment.3 Recent papers by Cuberes and Teignier (2015) and Cuberes
and Teignier (2017) model own account workers in a similar way as I do here;
however, they do not study the role of financial frictions. One caveat is that
these models, including the one I present here, does not capture those own
account workers who do not work with capital.
This paper is also related to the literature on financial development and occu-
pation choice (See a survey by Buera et al. (2015)). This literature features a
binary occupation choice, where agents choose between wage workers and en-
trepreneurs. The entrepreneurs have production function as in Lucas (1978).
Banerjee and Newman (1993) is different in that they include an occupation
category similar to own-account workers, but they do not model heterogeneous
abilities, and their focus is on borrowing constraint, the typical way of mod-
elling financial development in the literature. The borrowing constraint can be
motivated from a moral hazard problem. In my model, the increase in cost of
borrowing is similar to the borrowing constraint, but this paper differs by hav-
ing the extra channel through lower return on savings. Antunes et al. (2008)
model both the borrowing constraint and a wedge between cost of borrowing
3Gollin (2008) is essentially a capital accumulation story. In his model, holding capital
stock constant, change in TFP does not change occupation shares. However, holding TFP
constant, change in capital stock does affect occupation choice. A higher TFP is associated
with a higher steady state capital stock, and with an elasticity of substitution between labour
and capital less than one, higher capital stock generates lower share of entrepreneurs.
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and return on savings, but as in most other papers, they focus on the binary
choice between wage workers and entrepreneurs.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents the observed relation-
ship between occupation shares and net interest margin, an empirical measure
of cost of intermediation. Section 1.3 presents a static model with three occupa-
tions, and Section 1.4 illustrates this model’s mechanisms and emphasizes the
importance of the joint distribution of wealth and ability. Section 1.5 presents
a dynamic model with endogenous saving decision, calibrate the model, and
then compares the model’s prediction with the data. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Motivating Facts
How does the entrepreneurship rate change with development level? Figure 1.3
shows the negative relationship between the share of entrepreneurs (business
owners) and per capita income, using data from the Global Economic Monitor,
Adult Population Survey 2013 (GEM APS). The left panel excludes business
owners in the agricultural sector while the right panel includes them.
Very often all business owners are regarded as entrepreneurs, regardless of
whether they have no paid employees.4 Using this definition of entrepreneurs,
it has a puzzling implication that entrepreneurship rate is higher in develop-
ing countries (see for example (Poschke; 2015)). However, the small business
owners without employees are very different from those who have employees.
The former withdraw labour services from the market while the latter actively
create jobs for others. For this reason it is reasonable to use the finer classifi-
cation of employment provided by the ILO. Here, I focus on three employment
groups: employees, own-account workers and employers. Employees (wage
4GEM defines entrepreneurs to be "any attempt at new business or new venture cre-
ation, such as self-employment, a new business organization, or the expansion of an existing
business, by an individual, a team of individuals, or an established business".
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workers) are those who get a basic remuneration not directly dependent on
the revenue of the employer. Employers are those who hold self-employment
jobs and engage one or more person to work for them as employees on a con-
tinuous basis. Own-account workers are those who hold self-employment jobs
and do not engage employees on a continuous basis.5 Figure 1.4a shows the
correlation between the share of own-account workers and GDP per capita,
and Figure 1.4b shows the correlation between the share of employers and
GDP per capita.
The correlation is negative for own-account workers and positive for employers.
The different correlations suggest that own-account workers and employers
need to be treated separately. Furthermore, if we think of employer as a proxy
for entrepreneur, this suggests that the entrepreneurship rate will be lower in
developing countries.
This paper focuses on the role of financial intermediation efficiency in affecting
the occupation shares. A widely used measure of financial intermediation
efficiency is the net interest margin. It is the accounting value of bank’s net
interest revenue as a share of its average interest-bearing assets. A higher net
interest rate margin indicates a large difference between borrowing and saving
interest rate, and hence a lower efficiency of financial intermediation.6
5ILO also reports three other categories: Members of producers’ cooperatives, who hold
self-employment jobs in a cooperative producing goods and services, where the members take
part on an equal footing in making major decisions concerning the cooperative; Contributing
family workers, who hold self-employment jobs in an establishment operated by a related
person, with a too limited degree of involvement in its operation to be considered a partner;
Workers not classifiable by status. The shares of the members of producers’ cooperatives
and the unclassified are negligible, but in some countries, the share of contributing family
workers is not negligible in size. However, this paper chooses to focus on own-account worker,
wage workers and employers. One reason is that ILO notes for some countries the data on
contributing family workers are unreliable.
6Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004), Beck (2007), Antunes et al. (2008), and Antunes et al.
(2013) all use net interest margin as a measure of financial efficiency. The measure that
directly corresponds to my model would be the interest rate spread, the difference between
lending rate and deposit rate. However interest rate spread has limited cross country com-
parability, so I follow the literature by using the net interest margin.Beck (2007) notes that
the main difference between interest rate spreads and net interest margins are lost interest
revenue on non-performing loans.
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Table 1.1: Conditional correlation
2013
share of own-account workers
private credit GDP ratio -0.0164
(0.0230)
bank net interest margin 3.266***
(0.426)
Constant 7.736**
(3.901)
Observations 86
R-squared 0.539
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data from ILO
aggregate series and WB.
Figure 1.5 plots the observed net interest margin and occupation shares for
2006 and 2013, before and after the peak of the financial crisis. In places of a
high interest rate margin, the share of own-account worker is higher and there
is almost no correlation between the share of employers and the net interest
margin.
Table 1.1 shows that the correlation between the share of own-account workers
and bank net interest margins still exists conditional on another widely used
measure of financial development, the credit GDP ratio. A similar pattern
holds true for other years as well.7
Some may argue that one reason there are so many own-account workers in
developing countries is that labour forces in those countries have lower hu-
man capital level. Here I show some evidence suggesting that, at least, the
lower human capital story alone cannot explain all. I use the GEM APS 2013
data to calculate the share of own-account workers within each of three ed-
ucation categories: some secondary education (no degree), secondary degree,
7For other years with data available, correlation with credit GDP ratio is sometimes
significant. Correlation with net interest margin is always significant. Some may argue that
people become own account workers because they do not have bank accounts. I have not
looked at all countries yet, but one example is Brazil. The share of population with an
account in a financial institution increased from 61.1 in 2011 to 71.1 in 2014 for men, and
from 51 to 64.8 for women. Yet the share of own account workers actually increased from
23.7 in 2009 to 25.3 in 2014.
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and post secondary education. The GEM survey asked business owners how
many employees they had. If the answer was zero, I classify this person as an
own-account worker. Figure 1.6 plot the share of own-account workers in one
education category against the share in another. It shows that in places where
a higher share of the less educated become own account workers, a higher share
of the better educated also become own account workers. This suggest that in
some countries, people of all education categories are more likely to become
own-account workers. In the Appendix 1.7.2, I show the education distribu-
tions of occupations for a set of countries. Own account workers come from
all education categories, despite they have lower education level on average.
Table 1.2 uses the IPUMS data to calculate the share of own-account workers
among working age males and regress it on net interest margin and other
control variables. It suggests that controlling for TFP and industry share,
the correlation between share of own account workers and net interest margin
survives.
1.3 A Static Model
This section presents a static occupation choice model, taking into account
the inefficiency of financial intermediation. The inefficiency is modelled as
the fraction of resources lost during the intermediation process. This can be
thought of as the cost of intermediation, a deadweight loss. For each unit of
capital intermediated, a fraction 1− λ is lost, and the fraction λ arrives with
the borrowers. Let Rs denote the gross return on savings and Rb the cost of
borrowing, thus:
Rs = λRb (1.1)
where 0 < λ < 1. This creates a wedge between the cost of borrowing and
return on savings. While λ is treated as an exogenous parameter, both interest
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Table 1.2: Share of own account worker regression, IPUMS data
share of oaw
Bank net interest margin 0.0126**
(0.00609)
TFP -1.41e-05**
(6.37e-06)
Share with less than primary education -0.0682
(0.453)
Share with primary education completed -0.119
(0.441)
Share with secondary education completed -0.329
(0.513)
Share of individuals working in wholesale and retail -0.756*
(0.407)
Share of individuals working in manufacturing -0.594
(0.414)
Capital output ratio 0.00697
(0.0167)
Constant 0.624
(0.445)
Observations 63
R-squared 0.593
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. I download 222
samples from IPUMS. I calculate the share of own account workers among males whose
ages are between 16 and 60, and then I regress it on bank net interest margin, TFP
(calculated using PWT9.0), share of wholesale and retail, share of manufacturing and
educations shares. Countries and years included are: Argentina (2001), Bolivia (2001),
Brazil (2000, 2010), Botswana(2001), Canada(2001), Chile(2002), Cameroon(2005), Colom-
bia(2005), Costa Rica(2000), Ecuador(2001), Ecuador(2010), Egypt(1996), Egypt(2006),
Spain(2001), Fiji(2007), France(1999, 2006), Ghana(2000, 2010), Haiti(2003), Hun-
gary(2001), India(1999, 2004, 2009), Iraq(1997), Italy(2001), Jamaica(2001), Jordan(2004),
Cambodia(2008), Liberia(2008), Morocco(2004), Mexico(2000), Mexico (2010), Mali(1998),
Mongolia(2000), Malawi(1998, 2008), Malaysia(2000), Nicaragua(2005), Panama(2000,
2010), Peru(2007), Philippines(2000), Poland(2002), Portugal(2001), Paraguay(2002), Ro-
mania(2002), Rwanda(2002), Sudan(2008), El Salvador(2007), Thailand(2000), Trinidad
and Tobago(2000), Turkey(2000), Uruguay(1996), Uruguay(2006), Venezuela(2001), Viet
Nam(2009), South Africa(1996), South Africa(2001, 2007), and Zambia(2000, 2010)
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rates Rb and Rs are determined in equilibrium. 8
There is a continuum of measure one agents, indexed by i. Agents potentially
differ in wealth ai, and ability γi. Ability is drawn from a random distribution
f(γ), and it affects an agent’s income in every occupation. Based on wealth
and ability, each agent chooses the occupation to maximizes total income.
If an agent decides to be a worker, she receives total wage income γiw, where
w is the wage rate and γi can be thought of as the efficiency labour units
this agent provides to the labour market. As a wage worker, she supplies all
her wealth to financial intermediaries and receives aiRs in return. The total
income is
Iw(ai) = γiw + aiRs (1.2)
For the agent who becomes an own account worker, the production technology
is
Aoγik
α
o,i (1.3)
Productivity has two components. The aggregate productivity Ao applies to
all own account workers. The idiosyncratic productivity is the ability γi. The
only labour input is the own account worker’s own time. Given ability γi and
wealth ai, an own account worker chooses capital input ko,i to maximize his
income:
max
ko,i
Aoγik
α
o,i +

(1− δ)ko,i −Rb (ko,i − ai) ; borrow
(1− δ)ai; own wealth
(1− δ)ko,i +Rs (a− ko,i) +Rsai; save
(1.4)
where δ is the depreciation rate. She can either borrow, use her own wealth or
save part of her wealth with intermediaries.
8This papers focuses on how interest rate spread affects occupation choices rather than
explaining why it varies across countries.
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The maximized total income, depending on wealth ai and ability γi, is the
following:
Io(ai,γi) =

(1− α) (γiAo)
1
1−α
(
α
Rb+δ−1
) α
1−α
+Rbai; ai < ko(γi, Ao)
γiAoa
α + (1− δ)ai; ko(γi, Ao) < ai < ko(γi, Ao)
(1− α) (γiAo)
1
1−α
(
α
Rs+δ−1
) α
1−α
+Rsai; ai > ko(γi, Ao)
(1.5)
with the corresponding capital demand:
ko(ai,γi) =

a(γi, Ao); ai < ko(γi, Ao)
ai; ko(γi, Ao) < ai < ko(γi, Ao)
a(γi, Ao); ai > ko(γi, Ao)
(1.6)
where ko(γi, Ao) =
(
αγiAo
Rb+δ−1
) 1
1−α and ko(γi, Ao) =
(
αγiAo
Rs+δ−1
) 1
1−α .
Figure 1.7 illustrates the total income of an own-account worker for a given
borrowing interest rate Rb. When financial intermediation is perfect (λ = 1),
the total income Io(ai,γi) is a straight line and ko(γi, Ao) is equal to ko(γi, Ao).
Agents with wealth below ko(γi, Ao) borrow and any agents with wealth above
ko(γi, Ao) save. When financial efficiency deteriorates (λ < 1), return on sav-
ings Rs falls for any given level of borrowing interest rate Rb.9. The total
income of net borrowers, those with wealth level below ko(γi, Ao), is not af-
fected. They still borrow up to ko(γi, Ao), and pay interest rate Rb on the
borrowed capital ko(γi, Ao)− ai. For agents with wealth in between ko(γi, Ao)
and ko(γi, Ao), investing all wealth in the own-account business generates a
marginal return to capital in between Rb and Rs, so they invest all own wealth
and do not participate in the capital market. For agents with wealth above
ko(γi, Ao), investing more than ko(γi, Ao) in the own-account business would
9To make the difference between perfect intermediation case and imperfect intermediation
case more visible and for illustration purposes, I use the λ value of 0.5
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generate a marginal return lower than the market return on savings Rs, so they
invest ko(γi, Ao) in their own-account business and save the rest ai−ko(γi, Ao)
with financial intermediaries to earn return Rs. These agents will be net savers.
For an agent who becomes an employer, the production function is :
Aeγik
α
e,il
β
i (1.7)
with 0 < α + β < 1. Ae is the aggregate productivity of all employers. The
employers choose capital ke,i and labour li, depending on ability and wealth.
Similar to the own-account workers, an employer can borrow, save or use own
capital. Given ability γi and wealth ai, an employer chooses ke,i and le,i to
maximize the income:
max
{ke,i,le,i}
Aeγik
α
e,il
β
e,i+

(1− δ)ke,i − wle,i −Rb (ke,i − ai) ; borrow
(1− δ)ai − wle,i; own wealth
(1− δ)ke,i − wle,i +Rs (a− ko,i) ; save
(1.8)
Similar to own-account workers, employers can either borrow, use their own
wealth or save.
The maximized total income of an employer with ability γi and wealth ai is:
Ie(ai, γi) =

(1− α− β)
[
γiAe
(
α
Rb+δ−1
)α (
β
w
)β] 11−α−β
+Rbai; ai < ke(γi, Ao)
(1− β)
[
γiAe
(
β
w
)β
aαi
] 1
1−β
+ (1− δ)ai; ke(γi, Ao) < ai < ke(γi, Ao)
(1− α− β)
[
γiAe
(
α
Rs+δ−1
)α (
β
w
)β] 11−α−β
+Rsai; ai > ke(γi, Ao)
(1.9)
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with the labour demand:
l(ai, γi) =

[
γiAe
(
α
Rb+δ−1
)α (
β
w
)1−α] 11−α−β
; ai < ke(γi, Ao)[
γiAeβ
w
] 1
1−β a
α
1−β
i ; ke(γi, Ao) < ai < ke(γi, Ao)[
γiAe
(
α
Rs+δ−1
)α (
β
w
)1−α] 11−α−β
; ai > ke(γi, Ao)
and the capital demand:
ke(ai, γe,i) =

ke(γo,i, Ao); ai < ke(γi, Ao)
ai; ke(γi, Ao) < ai < ke(γi, Ao)
a(γe,i, Ae); ai > ke(γi, Ao)
where
ke(γi, Ao) =
[
γiAe
(
α
Rb + δ − 1
)1−β (
β
w
)β] 11−α−β
and
ke(γi, Ao) =
[
γiAe
(
α
Rs + δ − 1
)1−β (
β
w
)β] 11−α−β
.
When the employer is using her own wealth only, the labour demand does
not depend on the market interest rates. Figure 1.8 shows the income of an
employer, for the case where financial intermediation is perfect (λ = 1) and
and the case where it is imperfect (λ = 0.5), for given borrowing interest rates
Rb and wage rate w. In the perfect case (λ = 1), income is a straight line.
In the imperfect case ( λ < 1), those with wealth below ke(γi, Ao) borrow
and become net borrowers, but those with wealth in between ke(γi, Ao) and
ke(γi, Ao) use own wealth and do not participate in capital market. Those
with wealth above ke(γi, Ao) use exactly ke(γi, Ao) in their business and save
ai − ke(γi, Ao) in the capital market.
One thing to note is that here I do not model the fixed cost of operating
businesses. The fixed cost component is more important if the goal is to
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match establishment size or firm size distribution, but that is not the object
here. Moreover, in this paper, financial development is modelled as the cost of
intermediation instead of a borrowing constraint. Agents can borrow as much
as they wish at a given borrowing interest rate; adding an extra fixed cost
would simply mean they need to borrow more.
1.3.1 Perfect Financial Intermediation
In this case, financial intermediation incurs no cost at all, and the borrowing
interest rate Rb is the same as return on savings Rs. Given wealth ai, interest
income Rsai is the same for all occupations. Thus when deciding on occu-
pations, agents only consider the occupation income, the difference between
total income and interest income Rsai. In this case it can be explicitly written
out. The occupation income of a wage worker is γiw, the occupation income of
an own-account worker is (1−α) (γo,iAo)
1
1−α
(
α
Rs+δ−1
) α
1−α , and the occupation
income of an employer is (1− α − β)
[
γe,iAe
(
α
Rs+δ−1
)α (
β
w
)β] 11−α−β
. An own-
account worker claims a share (1 − α) of total output, higher than the share
an employer claims, (1−α−β). However, as ability increases the output of an
employer increases by much more than the output of an own-account worker.
This is because the ability is raised to power 1
1−α for own-account workers,
and it is raised to 1
1−α−β for employer. As a result, as ability increases, income
as an employer exceeds that of an own-account worker. This is illustrated in
Figure 1.9, in which there are two ability cut-offs shown. The agents with
ability higher than γh will be employers, those with ability lower than γl will
be wage workers and those in between will choose to be own-account workers.
Figure 1.10 plots the capital demand of own-account workers and employers
for agents of different abilities. As shown, when ability is extremely low, the
capital demand of an own-account worker is actually higher than that of the
employer. As ability increases, the amount of capital an employer can manage
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increases at a much faster rate than that of the own-account worker. Even for
the very capable agents, the amount of capital they manage as an own-account
workers is small. This captures the idea that own-account workers work with
small amount of capital.
The labour market clearing condition is:
γlˆ
1
γf(γ)dγ =
γmaxˆ
γh
[
γiAe
(
α
Rs + δ − 1
)α(
β
w
)1−α] 11−α−β
f(γ)dγ (1.10)
where the left hand side is the total efficiency labour units supplied to the
market by agents choosing to be wage workers, and the right hand side is the
total labour demand from employers.
The capital market clearing condition is:
K =
γhˆ
γl
[
αγiAo
Rs + δ − 1
] 1
1−α
f(γ)dγ+
γmaxˆ
γh
[
γiAe
(
α
Rs + δ − 1
)1−β (
β
w
)β] 11−α−β
f(γ)dγ
(1.11)
where the left hand side is the total wealth in the economy, the sum of indi-
vidual wealth ai. Under perfect financial intermediation, no resource is lost in
intermediation, and all wealth become capital used in production, as shown
on the right hand side. The first term on right hand side is the total capital
used by all own-account workers, and the second term is the capital used by
all employers.
The lower ability cut-off γl is implicitly determined by
γlw = (1− α)(γlAo) 11−α
(
α
Rs + δ − 1
) α
1−α
(1.12)
which states that an agent with ability γl must be indifferent towards becoming
a wage worker or an own-account worker. The higher ability γh is implicitly
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determined by
(1−α)(γhAo) 11−α
(
α
Rs + δ − 1
) α
1−α
= (1−α−β)
[
γhAe
(
α
Rs + δ − 1
)α(
β
w
)β] 11−α−β
(1.13)
which states that an agent with ability γh is indifferent towards becoming an
own-account worker or an employer.
To summarize, for a given joint distribution of ability and wealth, the equilib-
rium is composed of the market interest rates Rb = Rs, a wage rate w, and
the two ability cut-offs γl and γh such that equations (1.10) - (1.13) are all
satisfied. The total output Y in this economy is:
Y = Yo + Ye
=
γhˆ
γl
[
γAo
(
α
Rs + δ − 1
)α] 11−α
f(γ)dγ +
γmaxˆ
γh
[
γAe
(
α
Rs + δ − 1
)α(
β
w
)β] 11−α−β
f(γ)dγ
(1.14)
where Yo is the total output from all own-account workers and Ye is the total
output from all employers.
Proposition 1. In the case of perfect financial intermediation, the level and
distribution of wealth do not matter for occupation choice.
Proof. Rearrange equation 1.12 as:
γl =
[
1
Ao
w1−α (Rs + δ − 1)α
(1− α)1−α αα
] 1
α
(1.15)
and equation (1.13) as:
γh =
[
Ao (1− α)1−α αα
] 1−α−β
β
[Ae(1− α− β)(1−α−β)ααββ]
1−α
β
[
w1−α(Rs + δ − 1)α
]
(1.16)
Let x = w1−α(Rs+δ−1)α,γl = γl(x,Ao) and γh = γh(x,Ae, Ao) and substitute
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into equation (1.10):
γl(x,Ao)ˆ
1
γif(γ)dγ =
γmaxˆ
γh(x,Ae,Ao)
f(γ)
[
γiAe
ααβ1−α
x
] 1
1−α−β
dγ (1.17)
Given the parameter values, equation (1.17) solves x, the only unknown. This
value of x does not depend on wealth distribution or quantity of wealth. Hence
γl and γh do not depend on wealth distribution or quantity of wealth.
Even though wealth level does not affect the occupation outcome under perfect
intermediation, it does affect the equilibrium wages rate and interest rates. An
increase in aggregate wealth K leads to higher wage rate w and lower interest
rates Rb and Rs.10
Proposition 2. In the case of perfect financial intermediation, if Ao and Ae
simultaneously increase by the same percentage, γl and γh remain unchanged
and output increases by the same percentage.11
Proof. Equation 1.17 implies that when Ao and Ae increases by the same
percentage, x increase by the same percentage. Then, equations 1.15 and
1.16 imply that γl and γh remains unchanged.
A sector neutral productivity increase does not affect occupation choice.12
However when Ae increases relative to Ao, γl will increase and γh will fall,
resulting in higher shares of wage workers and employers, and a lower share of
own-account workers. If Ae continues to increase relative to Ao, then eventually
there will be no own-account workers in the economy, but wage workers and
10The result that quantity of wealth does not matter for occupation choice under perfect
financial intermediation is due to the Cobb-Douglas production function. In this case, the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is equal to one. Lucas (1978) shows that
capital accumulation lead to a declining share of entrepreneurs if and only if the elasticity
of substitution was less than one. Gollin’s(2008) quantitative result is based on capital
accumulation and a CES production function with elasticity less than one.
11This is also true for the case when financial intermediation is not perfect.
12This is also true even when financial intermediation is imperfect.
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employers will always exist. On the other extreme if Ao increases indefinitely
relative to Ae, then, eventually, to be an own-account worker will be the only
occupation agents choose.
1.3.2 Imperfect Financial Intermediation
In the case of imperfect intermediation, λ is smaller than one and some resource
is lost in transit. Both wealth and ability matter for occupation decisions.
Figure 1.11 illustrates this. The dotted lines represent the ability cut-offs
under perfect financial intermediation, and they are independent of wealth.
When λ is less than one, a wedge exist between cost of borrowing Rb and
return on savings Rs. The ability cut-offs γl(a) and γh(a) now depend on the
wealth level ai. As wealth ai decreases, both γl(a) and γh(a) increase, meaning
that the ability required to become own-account workers or employers will be
higher if agents have less wealth. For agents with medium-low abilities close
to γl(a), as wealth increases, the decrease in income due to a lower return
on savings becomes larger, so they are more likely to become own-account
workers. For agents with medium high abilities close to γh(a), if they choose
to be own account workers, the amount of wealth handed to intermediaries
is increasing in total wealth, because the amount of capital an own-account
workers can manage is limited. The low return on savings Rs reduces what
they receive from intermediaries, and to avoid this, they become employers,
which allows them to manage larger amount of capital and hire labour to make
their capital more productive.
For given wage rate w and interest rates Rb and Rs, agents decide on their
occupations. Depending on agents’ saving and borrowing decisions, agents can
be classified into seven finer categories: o(ai, γi) = w for those who choose to be
wage workers, o(ai, γi) = ob for own-account workers who borrow, o(ai, γi) = oa
for own-account workers who use their own wealth, o(ai, γi) = os for own-
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account workers who save, o(ai, γi) = eb for borrowing employers, o(ai, γi) = ea
for employers who use their own wealth and o(ai, γi) = es for employers who
save.
For a given joint distribution of wealth and ability G(a, γ), the equilibrium
wage rate w and interest rates Rb and Rs satisfy the interest wedge Rs = λRb,
the labour market clearing condition and capital market clearing condition.
The labour market clear is given by
¨
o(ai,γi)=w
γG(da, dγ) =
¨
{o(ai,γi)=es}∪{o(ai,γi)=ea}∪{o(ai,γi)=eb}
l(γi, ai)G(da, dγ)
(1.18)
where the left hand side is the supply of wage workers and the right hand side
is the demand from the employers. The total capital supplied to the market
is:
Ks =
¨
o(ai,γi)=ww
aiG(da, dγ) +
¨
o(ai,γi)=os
(a− ko(ai, γi))G(da, dγ)
+
¨
o(ai,γi)=es
(ai − ke(ai, γi))G(da, dγ)
It includes the capital supplied to the market by wage workers, own-account
workers who save and employers who save. The total demand for capital from
the market is
Kd =
¨
o(ai,γi)=ob
(ko(ai, γi)− ai)G(da, dγ) +
¨
o(ai,γi)=eb
(ke(ai, γi)− ai)G(da, dγ)
For business owners who want to use more capital than they have, they borrow
from the market. The first term is the amount own-account workers want to
borrow from the market and the second term is the amount employers wants
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to borrow. Then the capital market clearing condition is:
λKs = Kd (1.19)
which states that the total amount of capital supplied to the market multiplied
by the fraction successfully intermediated is equal to the amount agents want
to borrow.
The output from the employer sector is
Ye =
¨
{o(ai,γi)=es}
[
γiAe
(
α
Rs + δ − 1
)α(
β
w
)β] 11−α−β
G(da, dγ)
+
¨
{o(ai,γi)=ea}
[
γiAe
(
β
w
)β
aαi
] 1
1−β
G(da, dγ)
+
¨
{o(ai,γi)=eb}
[
γiAe
(
α
Rb + δ − 1
)α(
β
w
)β] 11−α−β
G(da, dγ)
which is the sum of output from employers who save, employers who use their
own wealth and employers who borrow. The output from the own-account
sector is:
Yo =
¨
{o(ai,γi)=os}
[
γiAo
(
α
Rs + δ − 1
)α] 11−α
G(da, dγ) +
¨
{o(ai,γi)=oa}
Aoγia
α
i G(da, dγ)
+
¨
{o(ai,γi)=ob}
[
γiAo
(
α
Rb + δ − 1
)α] 11−α
G(da, dγ)
which is the sum of output from own-account workers who save, who use
their own wealth, and who borrow. Then the total output in this economy is
Y = Ye + Yo.
Whenever financial intermediation is imperfect, the marginal product of capital
across business is not equalized and ranges between Rb and Rs.
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1.4 Role of Financial Intermediation in the Static
Model
In this section, I present some comparative statics of the static model to illus-
trate the model’s mechanisms. The parameters used are from Table 1.3 and
they will be explained in Section 1.5.
1.4.1 Role of Financial Intermediation
As λ falls, financial intermediation efficiency deteriorates. For given borrowing
interest rate Rb and wage rate w, the decrease in λ causes the return on savings
Rs to decline, so anyone with positive saving sees decline in total income.
A wage worker with sufficient high wealth is more likely to become an own-
account workers to manage his or her own wealth. This reduces capital and
labour supply to the market.
An own-account worker who saves with intermediaries is more likely to expand
the size of their own account business or switch to become an employer. Fig-
ure 1.12 illustrates this by showing the income of an agent who is indifferent
between becoming an own-account worker and an employer under perfect fi-
nancial intermediation (λ = 1). The left panel of Figure 1.12 shows that the
income from becoming an own-account worker and an employer exactly coin-
cide. The right panel illustrates when λ falls to 0.5, keeping borrowing interest
rate Rb and wage rate w constant. This leads to a fall in return on savings
Rs. If the agent has little wealth and borrows to become an own-account
worker or employer, then this agent is not affected by the fall of λ. However if
his wealth is high enough such that he saves some wealth with intermediaries
as an own-account workers, then he would switch to be an employer when λ
falls. The income for both own-account workers and employers decreases but
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the income for employers declines by less because employers can manage more
wealth. This increases capital and labour demand.
As the return on savings falls, employers who save will expand their businesses
and save less with intermediaries. This also increases the capital and labour
demand.
To summarize, for a given interest rate Rb and wage rate w, a fall in interme-
diation efficiency leads to excess demand for capital and labour. Interest rates
Rb and Rs and wage rate w will adjust to clear the market. An increase in wage
rate, given the borrowing interest rate, reduces the gap in both the labour and
capital markets. As the wage rate increases, becoming a wage worker becomes
more attractive. When own-account workers switch to be wage workers, they
supply their wealth to capital market, increasing both the labour and capital
supply. The higher wage rate also reduces capital and labour demand from
employers. Hence, it helps to clear the labour and capital market.
An increase in the borrowing interest rate does the same. An increase in bor-
rowing interest rate, given financial intermediation efficiency λ, also increases
the return on savings. Hence, own-account workers and employers borrow less
and reduce the amount of own wealth invested in businesses, increasing the
supply to capital market. The labour demand also falls with higher borrowing
cost. Some marginal own-account workers switch to be wage workers. Thus,
the higher interest rate also reduces both the gap in the labour and capital
market. As a result, what happens to the equilibrium borrowing interest rate
Rb and wage rate w will depend on parameters and the joint distribution of
wealth and ability, but to clear both capital and labour markets, either interest
rate Rb or wage rate w needs to increase.
For illustration Figure 1.13 shows the effects of financial intermediation, for
a given joint distribution between wealth and ability. The distribution used
here is the stationary steady state distribution obtained from the perfect in-
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termediation case from the dynamic model in Section 1.5. For now, I just take
this distribution as given. As financial intermediation deteriorates, borrowing
interest rate increases and saving interest rate decreases. The share of own-
account workers increases and the share of wage workers decreases. With this
joint distribution, the channels that increase the share of own-account workers
dominate. The fall in return on savings leads medium-low ability agents to
become own-account workers and manage some own wealth.
1.4.2 Role of Wealth Distribution
To illustrate the importance of wealth distribution, I change the distribution
used in Section 1.4.1 but keep the aggregate wealth the same, and then I study
how the model responds to changes in financial intermediation. For agents
with abilities lower than the 80 percentile, I change their wealth to zero. I
then redistribute this wealth equally to agents with abilities in the top 20%
percentile. Under perfect financial intermediation, this change of distribution
does not affect occupation choices. Figure 1.14 presents the results responding
to changes in financial intermediation.
Figure 1.14 and Figure ?? have different occupation shares, interest rates and
wage rate when λ < 1. In Figure 1.14, the share of own-account workers and
employers sum up to 20% at most.
The reason is that the bottom 80% agents have zero wealth. A fall in return
on savings does not affect their interest income because they have zero wealth
anyway. Their decision is between becoming a wage worker or a borrowing
own-account worker. However the cost of borrowing increases with a fall in
financial intermediation, so these agents remain to be wage workers. At the
same time, some agents with abilities in the top 20% switch from own-account
workers to employers, because this allow them to manage more wealth (the
re-distribution increases their wealth).
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As stated, the only difference between Figure ?? and Figure 1.14 is the wealth
distribution used. In the latter the vast majority of the agents, the medium-low
ability agents, have zero wealth. This points to the importance of the wealth
holdings of medium-low ability agents in determining occupations. This is one
of the key differences between this model and a model without own account
workers. In the standard model with wage workers and entrepreneurs only,
the wealth of the medium low ability agents are not important. Their abilities
are too low to become entrepreneurs, so they always become wage workers.
Their wealth does not directly affect their occupation choices except through
general equilibrium effects on the wage rate and interest rate(s). Hence, in the
binary choice model, frictions affect only the marginal entrepreneurs. Given
that entrepreneurial ability is rare, the agents on this margin constitute a small
share of the population. The large share of medium-low ability agents do not
respond to frictions. This limits the magnitude of occupation changes induced
by frictions. However, in this paper, becoming an own-account workers is an
option. This introduces an extra margin. Frictions affect (i) agents who are
on the margin between own account workers and employers, the medium-high
ability agents, and (ii) those who on the margin between wage workers and
own-account workers, the medium-low ability agents. Given the relatively large
share of medium-low ability agents, this model has the potential to generate
large occupation changes responding to frictions.
As illustrated, the joint distribution of wealth and ability is the key for un-
derstanding occupation shares under imperfect financial intermediation, but
it cannot be directly observed. I now turn to a dynamic model where agents
endogenously choose saving and wealth.
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1.5 A Dynamic Model
This section presents a dynamic model where wealth decision is endogenous.
At the beginning of each period, all agents receive a shock to ability. With
probability τ agents keep their abilities, and with probability 1−τ they receive
an independent new draw of ability.
After the ability shock, agents learn if they die at the end of this period. All
agents have equal probability of death d13. The value function of an agent who
will die at the end of the period is given by:
Vd(γ, a) =
c1−σ
1− σ + φ
a′1−σ
1− σ
where φ captures the bequest motive. For agents who survive to the next
period, the value function is given by:
Vs(γ, a) =
c1−σ
1− σ + ρ {τ (1− d)Vs (γ, a
′) + τdVd (γ, a′) (1.20)
+ (1− τ) (1− d)Eγ′ [Vs ((γ′, a′)] + (1− τ) dEγ′ [Vd (γ′, a′)]}
where ρ is the discount factor. The four terms inside the large bracket corre-
spond to the future value if this agent, at the beginning of next period, receives
no ability shock or death shock, receives no ability shock but receives a death
shock, receives an ability shock but no death shock, and receives both shocks.
13If agent are infinity lived, and ability remains forever, the equilibrium features financial
autarky. If agents are infinitely lived, but face shocks to ability, in equilibrium, low ability
agents saves nothing. This is because the expected future ability will be higher than today,
and if anything, they want to borrow against future income. In a case when financial
intermediation deteriorates, borrowing becomes more expensive, but agents can still borrow
as much as they wish.
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The budget constraints are the same for all agents irrespective of death shock:
c+ a′ = I(a, γ)
I(a, γ) = max{Iw(a, γ), Io(a, γ), Ie(a, γ)}
where Iw(a, γ), Io(a, γ), Ie(a, γ) are as described before. If an agent does not
die at the end of the period, this agent carries wealth a′ to the next period.
If an agent dies, a′ is the bequest left to offspring. The offspring inherit the
wealth and ability, and when they join the labour market at the beginning of
next period, they receive an ability shock like all other agents.
In this setting the death shock is irrelevant for occupation choices. When
agents choose occupations, their state variables include wealth a and ability
γ. A stationary equilibrium is composed of: a borrowing interest rate Rb, a
saving interest rate Rs, a wage rate w, an invariant joint distribution of wealth
and abilities G(a, γ), occupation policy function o(a, γ), consumption policy
function ct(a, γ) and saving policy function at+1(a, γ) such that:
(i) Rs = λRb;
(ii) agents optimally make occupation, consumption and saving decisions.
(iii)the labour market clears as described by equation (1.18).
(iv) the capital market clears. This requires the total capital demand from
those who borrow to be equal to the total capital supply net of the intermedi-
ation cost, as described in equation (1.19).
In this model, saving behaviour will depend on ability. For the highest ability
agents, they save because of the ability shock and the death shock. When
they receive a shock to ability, they are likely to draw an ability lower than
their current ability, and their income would be smaller. They save for this
uncertainty in income.They also save because they care about bequest. For the
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lowest ability agents, the death shock and ability shock work in the opposite
direction. If they receive a shock to ability, the chances are that the new ability
will be higher than the current one, generating a higher income. They have
the incentive to borrow against that future income. However, similar to high
ability agents, they also have the incentive to save for bequest.
The model is calibrated such that under perfect financial intermediation, it
matches moments of the US economy. Then I vary the financial intermediation
parameter to country specific level. This allows me to study the role of financial
intermedaition alone, holding all other parameters constant.
1.5.1 Calibration
I calibrate the model such that under perfect intermediation, the model matches
occupation shares and certain moments observed in the US. The model is cal-
ibrated to match annual data. Following Buera et al. (2011) I assume γi has
Pareto distribution. With an upper bound γmax, the probability distribution
is given by:
f(γ) =
ηγ−(1+η)
1− γ−ηmax
(1.21)
The parameters of the model include α, β, δ, Ao, Ae, γmax, η, ρ, d and σ.
Table 1.3 summarises the baseline parameter values. Three parameters are
exogenosuly chosen. This includes σ, δ and ρ. The relative risk aversion
parameter σ is 1.5, a standard value in the literature14. The annual capital
depreciation rate δ is set to be 0.55, and the annual utility discount ρ is set to
0.98.
Two parameters are calibrated outside the model. The probability of death d
14 De Nardi (2004) uses the same value in a framework with bequest.
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is 0.22, implying an average working life of about 45 years. The probability
of keeping the existing ability τ is chosen such that a wage worker remains a
wage worker again with probability 0.997. It is set to match the occupation
transition in Beckhusen (2014).15
The other parameters are model calibrated. The capital income share is cali-
brated to match a aggregate capital output ratio of 3.1. Under perfect financial
intermediation, capital output ration is:
K
Y
=
α
Rb + δ − 1
Targeting an interest rate of Rb− 1 = Rs− 1 = 0.04, together with the annual
capital depreciation rate, the implied value of α is 0.299, close to the standard
capital share.
For the two aggregate productivity, I normalize Ao to be one. As shown
in Proposition 2, the levels of Ao and Ae do not matter. Ae and γmax are
chosen such that, given the other parameters, the occupation shares match
the observed ones in the US. The target values are those reported from the
BLS report. In 2015, US has 89.9% wage workers, 7.6% own-account workers
and 2.5% employers. β and η are set jointly to match two targets. The first
target is the total compensation of employees as a percent of GDP, which was
between 53% to 54% from 2010 to 2015 16. Here I target a value of 53%.
The second target is the labour income of the top 1%. Piketty et al. (2016)
report that the top 1% income share in the US is around 21% but around 9%
is labour related income. In the model’s perfect financial intermediation case,
occupation income and capital income can be separated. I match the model’s
top 1% occupation income to the labour income in the data.
15Beckhusen (2014) presents monthly transitions. I use this to calculate the probability
that this agent will be in the same occupation after 12 months. The probability that the
agent will remain self-employed after one month is the same as the probability that the
agent will remain self-employed after 12 months.
16Calculated from BEA Table 1.10. Gross Domestic Income by Type of Income.
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Table 1.3: Parameters
Exogenously set
σ 1.5 coefficient of relative risk aversion
δ 0.055 annual depreciation
α 0.299 capital income share
ρ 0.98 per annual
d 0.022 expected working life of 45 years
Ao 1 normalization
Calibrated
τ 0.97 occupation transition
Ae 1.0115 occupation shares
γmax 2.7884 occupation shares
β 0.579 wage compensation: 54% of GDP
η 7.9 top 1% labour income: 9% of GDP
φ 0.01 annual interest rate: 4%
Finally, the incentive of bequest parameter φ is chosen such that, given all
the other parameters, it generates an annual interest rate of 4% in the perfect
financial intermediation case (Rb = Rs = 1.04).
1.5.2 Model Prediction and Data
Figure 1.15 summarizes the model’s responses to changes in the financial inter-
mediation efficiency λ while keeping all other parameters the same. I focus on
λ values ranging between 0.9 and 1, as this generates the relevant net interest
margin observed in the data. When comparing the model to the data, I match
the model’s prediction of the interest rate spread with the net interest margin
in the data. In the model, interest rate spread is Rb − Rs = (1 − λ)Rb, so λ
does not directly correspond to Rb − Rs. For each country, I find the λ value
such that the model generated interest rate spread (1 − λ)Rb is equal to the
net interest rate margin observed in the data. Each country is assigned a λ
value.
As λ falls to 0.90, the share of wage workers decreases from about 90% to
64.8%, the share of own-account workers increases from 7% to 33.4%, and
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the share of employers falls from 2.5% to about 1.8%. With the fall of λ,
the output in the own-account worker sector increases and the share of the
output in the employer sector falls. Overall output falls by about 17.72%.
Relative to the occupation share changes, the effect on output is modest. One
reason is that most of the occupation change comes from the medium-low
ability agents. When they change occupations, the impact on output is, thus,
relatively modest.
The magnitude of share of occupation change is roughly consistent with the
data. To compare the model with the data, Figure 1.16 and Figure 1.17 plot
the model’s prediction of the share of own-account workers and wage workers
against the observed data, focusing on own-account workers and wage workers.
For own-account workers, the correlation between the model prediction and
data is about 0.75 and for wage workers it is about 0.7.
1.5.3 Decomposing Channels
As explained, there are four types of individuals affected by changes in financial
intermediation level. Figure 1.20 labels the four categories. When financial
intermediation falls, Type I switch from wage workers to own account workers,
Type II switch from own account workers to wage workers, Type III switch
from own account workers to employers, and Type IV switch from employers
to own account workers. When λ falls from 1 to 0.9, share of own account
workers increase by 26.6 percentage point. Table 1.4 summarizes the four
channels’ contribution to this increase. Obviously, type I agents, medium low
ability agents with some wealth, is the driving force of the pattern we observe
in the data.
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Table 1.4: Decomposing Channels
Total Change Type I Type II Type III Type IV
+26.6 +26.8 −0.8 −0.1 +0.8
Note: This is the change in own account worker share when λ falls from 1 to 0.9.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that own-account workers and employers are differ-
ent and need to be treated separately. Having a large share of self-employment
and small business owners does not mean a country is more entrepreneurial. I
have argued that financial intermediation can help explaining the cross coun-
try differences in occupation shares. A lower financial intermediation efficiency
leads to a higher cost of borrowing and lower return on savings. Agents who
save with financial intermediaries are more likely to seek alternative occu-
pations to manage more wealth. Wage workers are more likely to become
an own-account workers, operating small businesses to manage their wealth.
Agents who need to borrow to become employers choose to be own-account
worker instead. The result is less capital and labour intermediated through the
market. The quantitative results presented here has shown that, by varying
financial efficiency, the model can account for over 70% of the cross country
variation in the share of own-account workers.
This paper takes an agnostic view on whether becoming an own-account work-
ers is a good thing. There are discussions on uncertainties associated with
own-account workers, and becoming an own-account workers may affect the
human capital accumulated from taking on a wage job. If for some reason
we wished to reduce the share of own-account workers, this paper suggests
that improving the efficiency of financial intermediation and reducing the gap
between the borrowing interest rate and deposit interest rate would help in
achieving this goal.
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1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Data
List of countries in the GEM data 2013: United States, Russia, South Africa,
Greece, Netherland, Belgium, France, Spain, Hungary, Romania, Switzer-
land, United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Poland, Germany, Peru, Mexico,
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Japan,
South Korea, Vietnam, China, Turkey.
List of countries used in constructing Figure 1.5 Australia, Austria, Burundi,
Burkina Faso, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bolivia, Canada, Switzer-
land, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cayman Islands, Czech Republic,
Germany, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Spain, Estonia,
Finland, United Kingdom, Georgia, Greece, Hong Kong, Honduras, Hungary,
Indonesia, Ireland, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Luxembourg, Latvia, Macau, Morocco,
Republic of Moldova, Malta, Mauritius, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Netherlands,
Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Palestine, Roma-
nia, Russian Federation, Serbia, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine, Uruguay,
United States, and South Africa.
1.7.2 Education distribution for individual countries
In developed economies, own-account workers come from all education groups.
Figure 1.21 and Figure1.22 plot the education distribution for each occupation
type for US and Canada. The education distributions of own-account workers
are very similar to those of the whole sample and other occupations as well.
For developing countries, Figures 1.23, to 1.27 illustrate the occupation distri-
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butions for Brazil, China, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela. While it is true
from the figures that for some countries the distribution of own-account work-
ers is slightly left skewed towards the lower education level when compared
with the whole sample, it is also obvious that they come from all education
categories.
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1.7.3 Solving the Dynamic Model
Here I explain the algorithm used to solve the dynamic model presented in
Section 1.5. I consider 11 values of λ ranging from 1 to 0.9. Instead of iterating
on the joint distribution of ability and wealth as most papers do, I iterate on
the wage rate and interest rate. I set the maximum of wealth agents can have
to be 2000, and the smallest wealth to be zero. I draw 150 γ values from the
distribution and assign the weight on the grid. Let P be the joint distribution
matrix at the beginning of the period. For each given value of λ, i do the
following:
Step 1: Start with guesses of wage rate w and borrowing interest rate Rb. Let
return on savings Rs be λRb.
Step 2: For the given wage rate w and interest rates Rb and Rs, I find the opti-
mal occupations of each ability-wealth pair (ai, γi) and calculate the resulting
total income.
Step 3: Based on the income matrix obtained, I do value function iterations
to find agents’ optimal saving matrix a′i(ai, γi). From this, I can obtain a
transition matrix Π that connects wealth distribution at the beginning of the
period to that at the end of the period.
Step 4: Find the stationary joint distribution between ability and wealth as-
sociated with this transition matrix. This can be done through iterations.
P ′ = f(τ, d,Π, P ) (1.22)
With a given P , a transition matrix pi and a probability τ of keeping the
same ability in the next period, and the probability of death d, I can work out
the beginning of period distribution of the next period, P ′. I keep iterating
until the difference between P and P ′ is small enough. For this process, I can
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start with any arbitrary joint distribution and it will converge to the same
stationary distribution.
Step 5: Given this stationary distribution just obtained, find the wage rate w′,
borrowing interest rate R′b and depositing interest rate Rb = λRs that clear
both labour and capital markets. This is done through a static iteration.
Step 6: If w′ and R′b are close enough to w and Rb, stop. If not, I update the
wage rate and interest rates, go back to Step 1 and repeat the process.
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Figure 1.1: Channels: with own-account workers
Figure 1.2: Channels: no own-account workers
Another prediction of the model is that as financial inefficiency decreases, the
share of own-account workers who use their own wealth will increase. They
are merely managing their own wealth without participating in the market.
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Figure 1.3: Share of business owners
Note: Weighted share calculated from GEM APS 2013. Left panel excludes business owners
in the agricultural sector and right panel includes them.
Figure 1.19 plots the fraction of own-account workers who uses own wealth
among all own account workers against the financial intermediation efficiency
parameter λ. As λ falls, the fraction of own-account workers who do not partic-
ipate in the market increases. This reduces the capital supplied to the market.
This is related to the most widely used measure of financial development, the
private credit to GDP ratio. As a comparison, Figure 1.18 plots the model pre-
dictions and data observed. With this set of parameters, the model generated
credit to GDP ratio, a measure of financial development, is around 2.4 when
financial intermediation is perfect. The total credit to the private sector as a
share of GDP is around 2 in the US in year 2013. The model generated credit
to GDP ratio is closely related to the observed in the data. Given that the
intermediation cost is the only friction in the model and no other constraint
on borrowing is imposed, the model does a good job in delivering a correlation
coefficient of about 0.75.
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Figure 1.4: Occupation Shares
(a) Share of own-account workers
(b) Share of employers
Note: data from PWT and ILO 2013.
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Figure 1.5: Net interest margin and occupation choices: 2006 and 2013
Data: WB and ILO.
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Figure 1.6: Share of own-account workers in each education category
Data: GEM APS 2013. GEM has four education categories: some secondary education
(no degree obtained), secondary degree, post secondary education, and graduate experience.
Here I focus on the first three categories and I calculate the share of own account workers
within each education category.
Figure 1.7: Total income of an own-account worker Io(ai,γi)
Notes: Parameters: γi = 3. α = 0.35, β = 0.5, Rb = 1.05, Rs = λRb, δ = 1.
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Figure 1.8: Total income of an employer
Parameters: γi = 3. α = 0.35, β = 0.5, Rb = 1.05, Rs = λRb, w = 1.5, δ = 1.
Figure 1.9: Occupation income and ability
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Note: Occupation income is total income minus interest payment.
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Figure 1.10: Capital Demand
Note: The parameter values, wage rate and interest rates used to create this plot are from
Section 1.5. The only difference is δ = 1.
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Figure 1.11: Occupation choices
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Figure 1.12: Income when λ falls
Note: On the left panel, the two lines exactly coincide.
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Figure 1.13: Static Model Response to Different λ
Note: Parameter values are from Table 1.3. Distribution used is stationary distribution
under perfect financial intermediation from the dynamic model in Section 1.5
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Figure 1.14: Static Model Response to Different λ: a different wealth distri-
bution
Note: Parameters are the same as in Figure ??. However, the wealth of the agents with
abilities at the bottom 80% are removed and redistributed to the top 20%.
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Figure 1.15: Dynamic Model Response to Different λ
Figure 1.16: Own-account Workers
Correlation is 0.75
Figure 1.17: Wage Workers
Correlation:0.7
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Figure 1.18: Credit over GDP: model and data
Correlation:0.7
Figure 1.19: Model: share of non-borrowing own-account workers
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Figure 1.20: Occupation choices
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Figure 1.21: Occupations and Education: US
Data: 2015 CPS March. Education Attainment left to right: less than 1st grade; 2nd, 3rd or
4th grade; 5th or 6th grade; 7th or 8th grade; 9th grade; 10th grade; 11th grade; 12th grade
no diploma; high school grad-diploma or equiv. (GED); some college but no degree; associate
degree-occupational/vocational; associate degree-academic program; Bachelor’s degree (ex:
BA, AB, BS); Master’s degree (ex: MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW); Professional school deg
(ex: MD, DDS, DVM); Doctorate Degree (EX: PhD, EdD)
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Figure 1.22: Occupations and Education: Canada
Data: IPUMS. Education categories left to right: below grade 5; grades 5-8; grades 9-13; high
school graduation certificate; trades certificate or diploma; non-university without trades
or college certificate or diploma; non-university with trades certificate or diploma; non-
university with college certificate or diploma; university, no certificate, diploma or degree;
university or college certificate or diploma; bachelor or first professional degree; certificate
or diploma above bachelor level; Master’s degree; Doctoral degree.
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Figure 1.23: Occupations and Education: Brazil
Data: IPUMS. Years of schooling starts from 0.
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Figure 1.24: Occupations and Education: China
Data: 2013CHFS. Education categories from left to right: no school, primary school, junior
high school, senior high school, vocational high school, vocational college, college degree,
master, phd.
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Figure 1.25: Occupations and Education: Mexico
Data: IPUMS. Years of schooling starts from 0.
Figure 1.26: Occupations and Education: Panama
Data: IPUMS. Years of schooling starts from 0.
74
Figure 1.27: Occupations and Education: Venezuela
Data: IPUMS. Years of schooling starts from 0.
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Chapter 2
Fertility, Human Capital and
Aggregate Income: The One-Child
Policy
2.1 Introduction
After 35 years of mandatory fertility restriction, China ended its controversial
One-child Policy at the end of year 2015. The repercussions of the One-child
Policy have not fully unfolded yet since the oldest born under this policy
are still young adults. As a policy to curb population growth and promote
modernization, it certainly achieved its goal of reducing fertility, but its effects
on macro economic outcome such as aggregate income has not been carefully
studied. This paper tries to fill this gap.
The strict One-child policy was implemented in China in 1979. Since then
urban families were allowed only One-child. However, China’s family planning
policy started long before that, mostly through propaganda campaign. This
led to voluntary fertility decline already before the One-child Policy. In 1971,
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propaganda slogan “One-child isn’t too few, two are just fine, and three are
too many” appeared, and in 1973, China started to encourage couples to get
marriage later, increase the time gap between the having the first and the sec-
ond child and have fewer number of children in total (Zhang; 2017).1 Fertility
rate fell sharply between 1971 and 1978, shown in Figure 2.1. Urban fertility
fell to about 1.5 children per family prior 1979. It continued to fall to close to
1 after the mandatory implementation of One-child Policy.
This paper examines the effects of this fertility policy on individual human
capital and aggregate output. Data shows that as fertility declines, the share
of household expenditure spent on the education of a single child increases sig-
nificantly. In 1992, the share of household expenditure spent on the education
of a child around age 20 is less than 5%.2 In 2002, this share has reached to
about 20%, and remains at that level since then. This increase in education
spending, if translated into the human capital of the affected children, could
potentially increase their individual income and contribute positively to ag-
gregate income. However, the fertility decline itself reduces the size of future
labour force, and hence negatively affects aggregate income. To understand
the net effects, a quantitative model is necessary.
I first present a three period OLG model with a quantity-quality trade off in
a framework with intergenerational transfer.3 Parents give birth to children
not just because they love children. They also receive old age support from
children in the form of transfers, and the transfers receive are increasing in both
the number and human capital level of children. Parents, therefore, optimally
choose the number and the human capital level of children. When an exogenous
binding constraint on fertility rate is imposed, parents choose the maximum
number of children allowed and increase the human capital spending on each
1Zhang (2017) provides a detailed summary of the fertility policy going back to 1950s
and discusses how it is affected by changes of political leaders.
2This is the first year that I have data available.
3The structure of transfer is from Choukhmane et al. (2014). They also provide evidence
on the importance of the intergenerational transfer channel in China.
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child. This gives rise to the quantity-quality trade-off. The binding fertility
restriction results in a smaller size of the future labour force but a higher level
of individual human capital. However, the effect on aggregate human capital,
which depends on both labour force size and individual human capital level, is
unclear, and needs to be assessed quantitatively. Hence, I extend the model to
a 16 period OLG model, which allows me to carefully account for the timing
of human capital accumulation. I then calibrate the quantitative model and
compare the case with fertility restriction to the counter-factual case had there
been no restrictions on fertility.
The effects of a fertility restriction policy crucially depend on the difference
between the fertility rate under policy intervention and the counter-factual
fertility rate. As shown in Figure 2.1, the fertility started to decline prior to
the implementation of the One-child policy due to the propaganda campaign.
To match this, the fertility policy I feed into the model is a 2.5 children policy in
1970 to 1974, a 1.5 children policy in 1975 to 1979, and a strict One-child policy
since 1980. Getting the right counter-factual fertility is not so straightforward,
since the counter-factual fertility itself is not observable, and it is extremely
unlikely that it has remained at the same level before the fertility policies.
To address this issue, I feed in the model a time-varying cost of raising and
educating children estimated from the data, and this cost applies in both
the case with and without fertility restrictions. In the case with no fertility
intervention, the model generates a time-varying fertility rate, and I use this
as the counter factual fertility rate. The model’s calibration suggests that
counter-factual fertility falls from 3 children per family in 1960s to 1.6 children
per family in 2010s. This suggests that the current Two-children Policy is
non-binding on average for urban households.
The main results of this paper depend on the comparison between the model’s
prediction under fertility intervention with the counter-factual case. Calibra-
tion results suggest that generations born under the One-child policy see their
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income increase by 33%. However, policy intervention’s effect on aggregate
income has turned negative in around 2000, due to a smaller labour force.
It also implies that even if the quantity-quality trade-off exists on individual
level, it does not exist on aggregate level.
By addressing the counter-factual fertility issue, this paper contributes to the
debates on by how much the One-child Policy contribute to the observed fertil-
ity decline. Lavely and Freedman (1990), Yang and Chen (2004) and Li et al.
(2015), for example, argue that family planning policy has an important role,
but some others disagree. Whyte et al. (2015) argues that the fertility has
already started to decline even before the One-child Policy is implemented,
and Schultz and Zeng (1995) points to the concurrent voluntary fertility de-
cline in other east and south-east Asian countries. This paper’s result suggests
that the One-child Policy itself is still binding on average, even though the
counter-factual fertility has fallen due to the increase in the cost of children.
One caveat is that I only focus only on the urban households, so the aggregate
output in this paper is not directly comparable to China’s aggregate GDP.
One reason to focus on the urban household is that the policy is only strictly
implemented in urban area. Its enforcement in rural areas varies over time and
across provinces. Baochang et al. (2007) has a detailed summary of this. An-
other reason is that the quality-quantity trade off could potentially be different
in urban and rural area. In rural areas, sometimes children are expected to
help with the farm work. In this case, having more children could mean that
each child does less farm work and they may have a higher chance of receiving
more education. For these reasons, I focus on the urban household. Another
caveat is that the measure of human capital is based on the education invest-
ment children receive instead of outcome variable. However, as Choukhmane
et al. (2014) shows in their sample, the difference between outcomes of children
in families with and without twins is significantly different.
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This paper is related to the literature on the trade off between number of
children and quality of children, a mechanism that has been formally theo-
rized ever since Becker and Lewis (1973) and Becker and Tomes (1976) and
empirically examined using data of different countries(Rosenzweig and Wolpin
(1980)). Evidence is not always consistent. In the case of China, Li et al. (2008)
and Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) find evidence supporting quantity quality
trade-off looking at education outcomes, using twins as the exogenous varia-
tion. Qian (2009) exploits the the variation of the One-child Policy in rural
area and finds that having an additional child actually increase the enrolment
probability of the first child 4. These papers use the education outcomes as the
variable of interests. Choukhmane et al. (2014) focuses on education input and
points to a sizeable difference in education expenditure on each child between
single child families and twin families.
This paper is also related to the studies on the interactions between fertil-
ity and aggregate growth (See Barro and Becker (1989) andEhrlich and Lui
(1991)). Empirical work on this is relatively scant. Li and Zhang (2007) ex-
amine China’s family planning policy and conclude negative causal effect of
population on economic growth, supporting the Malthusian claim. However,
the results presented in this paper disagree.
Finally this paper is also related to the literature that explores the unintended
consequences of the One-child Policy. Banerjee et al. (2014) and Choukhmane
et al. (2014) investigate its role in explaining China’s high household saving
rate. Ebenstein (2008) and Li et al. (2011) examine One-child policy and the
distorted high male-female gender ratio in China.
In Section 2.2, I present a model of fertility and human capital choice to illus-
trate the main mechanisms. In Section 2.3, I analyze the model’s implication
4Some of outcomes in Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) are based on expectations as they
surveyed ageing 7 to 18 year old in 2012/2013 and their education is not completed yet.
Qian (2009) does not address the issue of average quality of children.
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when a binding fertility restriction is imposed. I then extend the model into a
16-period quantitative OLG model in Section 2.4, calibrate it and discuss the
results. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 Agent Problem
This section present a three-period OLG model with inter-generational trans-
fer, a channel that has been emphasized by Ehrlich and Lui (1991). I take the
transfer function used by Choukhmane et al. (2014). An agent lives for three
periods. An agent born at time t− 1 is a child in that period, a young agent
at time t and an old agent at time t+ 1.
A child receives human capital investment in the form of education goods paid
for by parents. The child does not make any decisions. A young agent supplies
labour and earns wage income. The young agent also decides on the number
of children, nt, and the units of human capital goods Et to give to each child.
The human capital formation takes this form:
ht = AhE
γ
t (2.1)
with 0 < γ < 1.5 Et is the unit of human capital goods a child born at
time t receives. Ah reflects the efficiency of the human capital formation. For
simplicity I do not model a separate sector that produces human capital goods.
Instead I assume human capital goods can be converted from consumption
good at price pE, so the total spending on human capital goods is ntpE,tEt.
5This formation of human capital abstracts from the years of schooling, which is usually a
factor considered. For example, the Ben-Porath (1967) human capital production function is
a Cobb-Douglas function of time spent, existing human capital and resource input. Manuelli
and Seshadri (2014) also assumes it to be a function of both time input and resource input.
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The young agent at time t, together with the agent’s siblings, makes transfers
to support their parents, who are old aged at time t. Each young agent gives
a fraction ψ n
ω−1
t−1
ω
of wage income to parents. The total transfer received by
parents, the old aged at time t, is ψ n
ω
t−1
ω
wy,t. ψ captures children’s generosity
to parents, and ω < 1 captures the free-riding between siblings. When nt−1
increase, n
ω−1
t−1
ω
falls. Each agent transfers a smaller share of their income to
parents.
Similarly, when the time t young agent becomes old at time t + 1, the total
transfer this agent receives from children will be ψ n
ω
t
ω
wy,t+1.
Assuming agents have log utility, the agent born at time t − 1 becomes an
active agent at time t and maximizes the following utility:
max
{nt,Et,cy,t,ay,t,co,t+1,}
Ut = ln(cy,t) + vln(nt) + βln(co,t+1)
subject to:
cy,t + ay,t =
(
1− ntφf − ψn
ω−1
t−1
ω
)
wy,t − ntpE,tEt (2.2)
co,t+1 = Rt+1ay,t + ψ
nωt
ω
wy,t+1 (2.3)
where υ in the utility function represents the love of children. This agent
chooses fertility rate nt, units of human capital goods Et, young-age consump-
tion cy,t, saving at the end of the young period ay,t, and old age consumption
co,t+1. Equation 2.2 is the budget constraint when this agent is young. ntφf
is the fraction income used to pay for the fixed cost of raising children, and
ψ
nω−1t−1
ω
is fraction transfered to parents. Equation 2.3 is the budget constraint
when this agent becomes old.
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2.2.2 Production
I assume the production function takes the standard Cobb-Douglas form with
labour augmenting productivity:
Yt = K
1−α
t (AtLt)
α (2.4)
where
Lt = Ny,tht−1 (2.5)
is the efficient labour units. The agents who are in the labour force at time
are t are young at time t, and the size of this cohort is Ny,t. They were born
at time t− 1 and received human capital goods Et−1, with the human capital
level ht−1.
2.2.3 Optimality Conditions and Equilibrium
Define kt = KtAtLt to be the efficient capital labour ratio. Assuming competitive
labour and capital market, wage rate and interest rate in this economy are:
wt = αAtk
1−α
t ht−1 (2.6)
Rt = (1− α)k−αt + 1− δ (2.7)
where Rt is the gross return to capital and δ is the depreciation rate.
The equilibrium of this model is composed of the series of factor prices {wt,Rt}∞t=0
and the series of agents choice variables {nt, Et, cy,t, ay,t, co,t+1}∞t=0 that solve
the individual maximization problem and satisfy the the aggregate capital
condition:
Kt = Ny.t−1ay,t−1
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The consumption and saving decisions are standard and are shown in Appendix
2.6.1. Here I focus on the fertility and human capital conditions. The first
order condition for human capital spending Et is
ntpE,t =
1
Rt+1
ψnωt
ω
∂wy,t+1
∂ht
∂ht
∂Et
Rearrange it to be:
ntpE,t =
1
Rt+1
ψnωt γ
ω
wy,t+1
Et
(2.8)
where the left hand side is the marginal cost of buying one extra unit of human
capital goods for each child, and the right hand side is the discounted marginal
increase in transfer received next period. Holding interest rate and price of
human capital goods constant, equation (2.8) shows a negative relationship
between fertility and human capital goods. When there are more children,
the marginal cost of buying one unit of human capital goods increases linearly
with the number of children, but marginal benefit is diminishing. This with
a higher fertility rate, parents buy less human capital goods for each child.
This equation generates the key quantity quality trade-off in this model. It
also indicates that when interest rate R is higher, parents invest less in human
capital, because the alternative investment channel through saving becomes
more profitable.
The first order condition for fertility nt is given by:
v
nt
=
1
cy,t
(
φfwy,t + pE,tEt − 1
Rt+1
ψnω−1t wy,t+1
)
(2.9)
The left hand side is the direct gain in utility, while the right hand side is the
discounted net marginal cost of a child. φf represent the fixed cost, and pE,tEt
is the spending on human capital goods. ψnω−1t wy,t+1 is the marginal transfer
received next period.
The fertility first order condition (equation (2.9)), combined with consumption
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decision (equation (2.26)) and human capital first order condition (equation
(2.8)) gives:
v
nt
=
(1 + β)
(
φfwy,t +
(
1− ω
γ
)
pE,tEt
)
(
1− ψ n
ω−1
t−1
ω
− ntφf
)
wy,t −
(
1− 1
γ
)
ntpE,tEt
(2.10)
and it can be further rearranged as:
(1 + β + υ) (1− λ) pE,tEt
wy,t
= − (1 + β + υ)φf +
υ
[(
1− ψ n
ω−1
t−1
ω
)]
nt
(2.11)
where λ = (1+β)ω+υ
γ(1+β)+γυ
.
Assumption 2.1. Assume ω > γ. This is a sufficient condition for λ > 1.
When Assumption 2.1 is satisfied, equation (2.11) implies a positive relation-
ship between the fertility rate nt and quantity of human capital goods Et.
When children are of higher human capital, parents would like to have more
children. An increase in human capital level of the children increases both the
marginal cost of and the marginal benefit from children, but when ω > γ, the
marginal return from having more children increases more than the cost, so
the parents are willing to have more children. Intuitively, a larger ω means
less free-riding between siblings, hence making investing in children more prof-
itable.
The aggregate capital stock used in production at time t + 1 comes from the
savings of time t young agent, with Kt+1 = Ny,tay,t. Substitute in the human
capital condition equation (2.8) and saving decision equation (2.28), it becomes
Kt+1 = Ny,t
{
β
1 + β
[(
1− ψn
ω−1
t−1
ω
− ntφf
)
wy,t − ntpE,tEt
]
− 1
1 + β
ntpE,tEt
γ
}
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divide both sides by Ny,twy,t gives:
(1 + β)
kt+1
αk1−αt
gA
Eγt
Eγt−1
nt =β
[(
1− ψn
ω−1
t−1
ω
− ntφf
)
− ntEt pE,t
wy,t
]
− ntEt
γ
pE,t
wy,t
(2.12)
Given exogenous human capital goods price series pE,t, the human capital
condition equation (2.8), the fertility condition equation (2.11) and physical
capital condition equation (2.12), together with the wage rate equation (2.6),
interest rate equation (2.7) and human capital formation equation (2.1) char-
acterize the equilibrium of the model in {nt, Et, ht, wy,t, Rt, kt}∞t=0.
2.2.4 Steady State
The model admits a steady state equilibrium when price of human capital
goods grows at the same rate as wage, such that pE,t
wy,t
= pE
wy
. For now I assume
it is the case, and I will present more data on this later. I also assume TPF
grows exogenously at rate At+1
At
= gA. With these assumptions, we can further
simplify the equilibrium conditions. Substitute in these assumptions, wage
rate equation (2.6), interest rate equation (2.7) and human capital formation
equation(2.1) into the the human capital condition equation (2.8), the fertility
condition equation (2.11) and physical capital condition equation (2.12), we
get:
Equation (2.11) now becomes:
(1 + β + υ) (1− λ) pE
wy
E = − (1 + β + υ)φf +
υ
[(
1− ψ nω−1
ω
)]
n
(2.13)
Equation (2.8) now becomes:
pE
wy
E =
gA
R
γψnω−1
ω
(2.14)
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Equation (2.12) now becomes:
(1 + β)
1− α
α
gAn
R
= β
(
1− ψn
ω−1
ω
− nφf
)
−
(
β +
1
γ
)
pE
wy
nE (2.15)
Equation (2.13), (2.14) and (2.15) characterize the steady state equilibrium in
consumption of human capital goods Ess, fertility rate nss and interest rate
Rss.
To better understand the mechanisms of the model, I provide some graphical
illustration. For a given fertility rate n, Figure 2.2 plots the human capital con-
dition equation (2.14) and physical capital condition equation (2.15) in units
of human capital goods E and interest rate R. The human capital condition
is downward sloping, because when interest rate is high, saving becomes more
attractive than investing in children, so parents purchase less human capi-
tal goods for children. Physical capital condition is upward sloping, because
when parents spend more on human capital goods, they save less in physical
capital, so return from saving is higher because of the diminishing marginal
productivity of capital.
Figure 2.3 then illustrates the movement of human capital and physical capital
conditions to a decline in fertility. Human capital condition shifts upward,
because for any given interest rate, when there is less children, marginal return
from an extra child is higher, so parents increase the spending on human capital
goods for each child. Physical capital condition shifts leftwards, because for
any given human capital level, a fall in fertility decrease the total spending and
increases saving, which reduces interest rate. The movements of the human
capital and physical capital conditions together imply a higher human capital
spending per child when fertility declines. This negative relationship between
fertility and human capital goods is summarized by the downward sloping
curve in Figure 2.4, labeled as capital condition. Mathematical description of
this curve can be obtained by combining equation (2.14) and equation(2.15)
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to substitute out R and get an expression in terms of n and E. It inherits the
quality-quantity trade-off from equation (2.14).
The other upward sloping curve in Figure 2.4 is the fertility condition, equation
(2.13). The intersection gives the steady state fertility nss and human capital
goods consumption Ess in this economy. In this steady state, interest rate Rss
and capital labour ratio kss will also be constant. Wage rate grows at the rate
of TFP growth. All other aggregate variables grow at the rate of TFP growth
multiplied by the fertility rate.
wy,t+1
wy,t
= gA (2.16)
Lt+1
Lt
=
Kt+1
Kt
=
Yt+1
Yt
= gAnss (2.17)
2.2.5 Comparative Statics
In this section, I show some of the model’s response to changes in parameters.
Proposition 3. As the fixed cost of raising a child φ increases, the number of
children will decrease. ∂n
∂φ
< 0.
This is intuitive. However, its effects on human capital spending per child, ∂E
∂φ
,
is ambiguous. Two forces operates at opposite direction. As parents reduce the
number of children, quantity quality trade-off means that they tend to invest
more in each child. However, the higher fixed cost also implies parents have
a smaller budge set, and they buy less of everything, including human capital
goods. Hence the effect on human capital goods E is ambiguous.
Proposition 4. When the price of human capital good increases relative to
income, it reduces the human capital of each child. ∂E
∂
pE
wy
< 0.
This is also intuitive, but its effects on fertility ∂n
∂
pE
wy
is ambiguous. As education
price increases, investing in children for old-age support becomes less appealing
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than saving. This reduces both the quality and quantity of children. However,
as parents invest less in the education of each child, the total cost of children is
lower, and because parents also enjoy having children, fertility tend to increase.
The net effect on fertility rate is ambiguous and will depend on parameters.
Proposition 5. A higher TFP growth increase both fertility rate and human
capital good consumption. ∂n
∂gA
> 0; ∂E
∂gA
> 0
A higher TFP growth indicates a larger productivity difference between now
and future. Children who join labour force in the future will have higher wage
income, and this benefit parents through higher transfers. As a result, parents
will increase both quantity and quality of children.
2.3 The Model with Fertility Restriction
In this section, I present the model with a fertility restriction. All variables
with subscript ss denotes the unconstrained steady state, while variable with
an upper bar denotes the constrained steady state. A binding exogenous fer-
tility restriction is imposed such that n¯ < nss.
2.3.1 Equilibrium Characterization
In this case agents cannot have a fertility rate higher than n¯, so they just choose
n¯. The fertility optimality condition, equation (2.13), becomes irrelevant and
is replaced by n = n¯. The equilibrium is then characterized by the constrained
version of the human capital decision and physical market clearing condition.
The human capital condition (2.14) now becomes:
pE
wy
E =
gA
R
γψn¯ω−1
ω
(2.18)
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and the physical capital market condition (2.15) now becomes:
(1 + β)
1− α
α
gAn¯
R
= β
(
1− ψn¯
ω−1
ω
− n¯φf
)
−
(
β +
1
γ
)
pE
wy
n¯E (2.19)
The above two equations solve the constrained steady state E¯ and R¯ under a
binding fertility restriction n¯.
2.3.2 Comparative Statics
Proposition 6. As long as n¯ < nss, ∂E∂n¯ < 0.
When fertility choice is restricted by n¯ < nss, the upward sloping fertility
condition in Figure 2.4 is irrelevant. The downward sloping capital condition
in Figure 2.4 alone summarizes the equilibrium. When parents are allowed
less children, they invest more in each children’s human capital, but the effect
on total human capital spending, n¯E¯, is ambiguous. The reason is that when
interest rate is held constant, a decrease in fertility will decrease the total
spending on education, and this tend to increase saving. As saving increases,
interest rate will fall. This then makes investing in children’s human capital
more attractive than saving, and tend to increase human capital spending.
Hence, the net result on total human capital spending, is ambiguous.
Since the spending on children’s human capital, together with the number of
children, determine the efficient labour units, the ambiguity in total human
capital spending lead to ambiguity in the change of the total efficient labour
units, the key determinant of aggregate income. To answer the question of
how a decline in fertility affects aggregate income, a quantitative exercise will
be necessary.6
6In a model where children human capital directly depends on parental human capital,
similar results hold.
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2.4 A Quantitative OLG Model
This section presents an extended quantitative OLG model and uses it to assess
the effect of fertility restriction on output. This extended model allows me to
match the observed timing of education expenditure. One period in the model
corresponds to 5 years in real life. I now describe the timing of the lifetime
events.
Human Capital Investment : In the first five periods of agents’ life, they
make no active decisions. They receive human capital goods paid for by par-
ents. I assume that in the first three periods they receive compulsory educa-
tion investment. Parents must pay for this. This corresponds to the nine-year
compulsory education in China, which children usually finish at around age 15.
The investments in the latter two periods, period four and five, corresponds
to high school and college education, and they are optional. Parents choose
the amount of education goods to be invested on their children in these two
periods.
Working and Saving : Agents start working in the fifth period, the same
period when their human capital is finalized. For simplicity, I assume that in
period five, the agent consumes the wage income and do not borrow against
future income. Starting from period six, agents optimally choose consumption
and saving.
Child birth : Agents decide on the number of children in the beginning of the
6th period in life. In the 6th, 7th and 8th period, agents pay the fixed cost of
children, and in the 9th and 10th period, agents choose the education goods
to be invested in children’s human capital.
Transfer : Agents transfer to their parents from the 8th to the 11th period
of their lifetime, which corresponds to the last four periods of their parents
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Table 2.1: The Timing of child-birth and transfer of an agent born at time
t− 4
Age Human Capital Investment Transfers
t-4 1 1-5 born
t-3 2 6-10
t-2 3 11-15
t-1 4 16-20
t 5 21-25 receive ht
t+1 6 26-30 give birth nt+1 compulsory
t+2 7 31-35 compulsory
t+3 8 36-40 compulsory to parents
t+4 9 41-45 discretionary to parents
t+5 10 46-50 determine ht+5 discretionary to parents
t+6 11 51-55 to parents
t+7 12 56-60
t+8 13 61-65 from children
t+9 14 66-70 from children
t+10 15 71-75 from children
t+11 16 76-80 die from children
Note: The human capital level ht of the agent born in time t− 4 depends on human capital
goods received from time t− 4 to t. Each agent’s human capital level are determined in the
fifth period in life.
lifetime. Similarly, when they are in the last four periods of their own lifetime,
they receive transfers from children. Table 2.1 summarizes the timing of these
events.
Follow the previous log utility assumption, the utility function of an agent
born at time t− 4 and enters the labour market at time t is:
Ut =
16∑
s=5
βs−6log(ct+s−5(s)) + υlog(nt+1)
where the subscript t denotes time period, and the subscript s denotes the age.
Taking into the timing of the education expenditure and transfers, the agent
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faces the following constraints:
ct(5) = wt(5)
ct+1(6) + at+1(6) = (1− nt+1φ6)wt+1(6)
ct+2(7) + at+2(7) = (1− nt+1φ7)wt+2(7) +Rt+2at+1(6)
ct+3(8) + at+3(8) =
(
1− nt+1φ8 − ψn
ω−1
t−4
ω
)
wt+3(8) +Rt+3at+2(7)
ct+4(9) + at+4(9) =
(
1− ψn
ω−1
t−4
ω
)
wt+4(9) +Rt+4at+3(8)− nt+1pE4,t+4Et+4(4)
ct+5(10) + at+5(10) =
(
1− ψn
ω−1
t−4
ω
)
wt+5(10) +Rt+5at+4(9)− nt+1pE5,t+5Et+5(5)
ct+6(11) + at+6(11) =
(
1− ψn
ω−1
t−4
ω
)
wt+6(11) +Rt+6at+5(10)
ct+7(12) + at+7(12) = wt+7(12) +Rt+7at+6(11)
ct+8(13) + at+8(13) =
ψnωt+1
ω
wt+8(8) +Rt+8at+7(12)
ct+9(14) + at+9(14) =
ψnωt+1
ω
wt+9(9) +Rt+9at+8(13)
ct+10(15) + at+10(15) =
ψnωt+1
ω
wt+10(10) +Rt+10at+9(14)
ct+11(16) =
ψnωt+1
ω
wt+11(11) +Rt+11at+10(15)
Here, φ6, φ7 and φ8 represent the compulsory education costs per child. pE4,t+4
( pE5,t+5) is the time t+ 4 (t+ 5) price of the human capital goods that a child
receives in the child’s fourth period in life. Et(s) is the amount of human
capital goods an age-s agent receives at time t. Parameters ψ and ω are the
same as before.
The human capital accumulation now has the following form:
ht+5 = Ah
[
Et+4(4)
τEt+5(5)
1−τ]γ (2.20)
where 0 < τ < 1 and γ < 1. It depends on human capital investment received
in the 4th and 5th period in life.7 I assume it only depends on the voluntary
7Cunha and Heckman (2007) discusses the how human capital investment across multiple
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investment for two reasons. The first reason is that the education investments
in the first three periods are compulsory, and the compulsory education is
very well implemented in urban china. Moreover, Choukhmane et al. (2014)
shows that the difference in education spending received by a single child and
a twin-child are not obvious before they reach 15 and becomes pronounced
after entering age 15.
The production function is the same as before, Yt = K1−αt (AtLt)α and k ≡ KtAtLt .
Lt includes the whole labour force at time t.
Lt = [e5Nt(5)ht + e6Nt(6)ht−1 + e7Nt(7)ht−2 + e8Nt(8)ht−3 + e9Nt(9)ht−4
+e10Nt(10)ht−5 + e11Nt(11)ht−6 + e12Nt(12)ht−7] (2.21)
It includes all people who are in the 5th period to the 12th period of their life,
es is the efficiency of age s agents. Nt(s) refers to the size of the time-t age-s
cohort. Similarly, capital at time Kt would include all the saving stock from
all agents last period.
Kt = Nt−1(6)at−1(6) +Nt−1(7)at−1(7) +Nt−1(8)at−1(8) +Nt−1(9)at−1(9)
+Nt−1(10)at−1(10) +Nt−1(11)at−1(11) +Nt−1(12)at−1(12)
+Nt−1(13)at−1(13) +Nt−1(14)at−1(14) +Nt−1(15)at−1(15) (2.22)
The wage income and interest rate in this economy are:
wt(s) = αAtk
1−α
t esht+5−s (2.23)
Rt = (1− α)k−αt (2.24)
where wt(s) is the wage rate of an s-year old agent at time t. In this model, the
choices for this agent born at time t − 4, whose human capital is determined
periods should be aggregated and emphasizes human capital investment in different time
periods are not perfect substitutes, so they are all important for the formation of human
capital.
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at time t and joins labour market at time t+ 1, includes fertility decision nt+1,
human capital spending Et+4(4), Et+5(5), consumption ct(s) series and saving
at(s) series.
2.4.1 Calibration of the quantitative OLG model
This section explains how I calibrate the model. The general approach is:
first, I calibrate the model to match data observed in 2000s. Assuming fertility
intervention is binding in these time period, this allow me to ignore the fertility
optimality condition. I use the cost of raising children observed in 2000s to
find the appropriate parameter values such that the model’s prediction under a
constrained fertility rate match certain features of the data observed in 2000s.
Then I keep the values of the matched parameters, but change the cost of
raising children observed in the early 1990s, and then I find the love of children
parameter υ such that the optimal unconstrained fertility is about 3 children
per family, the pre-1970 fertility rate before policy intervention. Table 2.2
summarizes the values of the parameters.
Matching Data Observed in the 2000s
The labour share α is taken from the average share of labour income from
year 1978 to 2003 reported by Bai et al. (2006). β is assumed to be 0.99
per annum. gA represents the TFP growth in this period. I choose it to be
5% growth. Ideally I would want to match the growth rate produced by the
model to the observed growth rate of China, but given the limited scope of
this paper, it does not make sense. One reason is I am only looking at urban
households. Also during this period, China went through major changes that
affected the growth. The privatization of state owned enterprises, the flow of
migrant workers from rural to urban area, and the huge inflow of foreign capital
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Table 2.2: Baseline Calibration
Parameters value target
α 0.52 labour share in Bai et al. (2006)
β 0.99 per annum
e6 0.733 average of UHS 1992 to 1995
e7 0.854 average of UHS 1992 to 1995
e8 0.951 average of UHS 1992 to 1995
e9 1.05 average of UHS 1992 to 1995
e10 1 average of UHS 1992 to 1995
e11 0.882 average of UHS 1992 to 1995
e12 0.655 average of UHS 1992 to 1995
φ6, φ7, φ7 time varying UHS 1992 to 2009
γ 0.45 absolute spending share
τ 0.6 relative spending share
υ 0.026 3 children per family pre-1970
pE timing varying changes in fees
gA 1.05 annual growth of 5%
ψ 0.1 Choukhmane et al. (2014)
ω 0.65 Choukhmane et al. (2014)
to name a few. None of these is incorporated here, so it would be a stretch too
far to match the model’s growth to the observed aggregate growth in China.
Instead I use an exogenous productivity growth of 5% per year. This is in the
range of numbers provided by studies examining the productivity growth in
China in the relevant periods (for example see Zhu (2012) and Young (2003)).
ψ and ω are parameters related to the transfer from middle-aged child to old-
aged parents. For now I use the estimates from Choukhmane et al. (2014),
because I also use their my transfer function.
es represent agent’s lifetime income profile. I regress log of wage on education
dummy and age category dummy for each year from 1992 to 1995 and average
them across years to get the values.
φ6, φ7, φ8: these three parameters capture the fixed cost of raising children in
the first, second and third period of a child’s life. φ6, φ7 and φ8 correspondingly
match the fraction of wage income spent on the education of children between
1 to 5 year old, 6 to 10 year old and 11 to 15 years old. Figure 2.5 shows the
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education spending as a fraction of household income for single child family
from year 1992 to year 2009. This fraction increases in the 1990s but has more
or less stabilized since 2000. I match the φ6, φ7 and φ8 to the average of the
spending share on children less than 15 years old observed in 2000s. The values
are 0.033, 0.067, and 0.068 correspondingly.
γ and τ : These two parameters are related to parents’ voluntary spending on
children’s education, the human capital goods. τ is used to match the relative
spending. In any steady state,
pE4E4
pE5E5
=
τ
1− τ (2.25)
Since the left had side of Equation 2.25 is directly observable in the data,
this pins down the value of τ . γ is the return to human capital parameter
in this model, and is used to match the absolute share of spending observed
in the data in the 2000s. In this exercise I assume a fixed γ through out.
One concern might be that the return to human capital in China has been
increasing. Table 2.4 summarizes the yearly mincer return from year 1992
to 2009. It has increased significantly since the privatization in 1990s and
then it has remained relatively stable in 2000s. For children born under the
One-child Policy, when they enter labour market, the return has stabilized,
so perhaps a constant γ may not be that a bad idea. I use γ to target the
absolute expenditure share on education. Figure 2.6 summarizes the data and
the model target on education spending.
Matching Pre-policy Fertility
So far I have not used the fertility optimality condition. The only parameter
left undetermined is υ, which captures the love of children. I proceed by
keeping the most of parameter values above constant. Two changes are made.
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Table 2.3: Education Fees per person
Year College fee per person high school fee per person
level growth rate level growth rate
1996 1477.12 307.49
1997 1823.75 0.23 382.63 0.24
1998 2144.72 0.18 419.11 0.10
1999 2921.71 0.36 484.34 0.16
2000 3463.60 0.19 576.41 0.19
2001 3927.71 0.13 673.50 0.17
2002 4324.25 0.10 737.93 0.10
2003 4561.89 0.05 810.66 0.10
2004 4857.09 0.06 898.23 0.11
2005 5070.67 0.04 994.13 0.11
2006 4931.45 -0.03 1008.33 0.01
2007 6489.44 0.32 1470.71 0.46
2008 7016.87 0.08 1585.81 0.08
2009 7182.25 0.02 1672.75 0.05
average 0.135 0.144
Data source: Educational Statistics Yearbook of China.
One is changing φ6, φ7 and φ8 to the values observed in 1992, and another
change is to assume the pre-1970 TFP growth to be zero. Given these, I find
the value of υ such that the unconstrained steady state fertility would be three
children per family, which is the observed fertility in the 1960s.8
2.4.2 Dynamic Transition
Over this time period, nominal education price has increased significantly. As a
proxy for the change in education price, I calculated the changes in high school
and college fees. Data is transcribed from Educational Statistics Yearbook of
China. I use the total fees divided by enrolment in the corresponding education
level to get the fee person. Table 2.3 summaries the change over this period. On
average, college fee increases by 13.5% annually and high school fee increases
by 14.4%.
8Ideally I want to match φ6, φ7 and φ8 to the values before 1970, but there is no data
available for that time.
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The question is whether this change is matched by nominal increase in wage
rate. I focus on the average wage increase of those between 40 to 50 years old.
Using data from UHS, I calculate that average wage increase by 14.8% annually
between year 1996 and 2001. Then from year 2002 to year 2009 average wage
increase by 10%. 9. This suggests that the growth of nominal wage income
roughly matches the education price increase before year 2000 and then fall
below that after 2000. I use the growth of fees relative to the growth rate of
wage to construct the relative price pE4,t+4
wt+4
and pE5,t+5
wt+5
. Since one period in the
model is equal to five years in real life, I use the five year average.
To solve the model, I also need initial distributions of population age, their
corresponding human capital, and wealth distribution. I use the urban popu-
lation distribution in year 1970 as the initial population distribution. I assume
all agents born before 1970 have equilibrium human capital level that is pre-
dicted by the unconstrained pre-1970 steady state of the model, and they also
hold the capital as in the pre-1970 steady state.
2.4.3 Results
This section presents the model’s results with and without fertility interven-
tion. The fertility intervention policy I feed into the model is a 2.5-children
policy from 1970 to 1974 and a 1.5-children policy from 1975 to 1979 and a
One-child policy since year 1980. In the case with no fertility intervention,
agents optimally choose fertility rate, and I call this the natural transitional
fertility.
The response of the model’s fertility rate and individual human capital is
summarized in Figure 2.7. The fall of fertility under the natural transition is
9First I calculate the wage increase of the 40 to 50-year-old for each education category
and then take the average of the wage increase. The reason I calculate for these two sub-
periods is because there is a change of classification of education category. I also calculated
the weighted mean of the growth of wage income. The results are very similar to the numbers
reported here
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due to the higher cost of raising children. However, it rises to above 1.5 (three
children per family) before it starts to fall. This is due to the construction of the
model. Agents have perfect foresight, so when parents decides on the number
of children to give birth to in 1970s, they foresee the higher productivity growth
after 1980, hence they will want to invest more in children, both in quantity
and quality. Under natural transition fertility stabilizes at around 1.6 children
per family (0.8 in the figure).
For individual human capital, the model predicts that the human capital level
of agents born under the One-child policy (after 1980) is about around 30%
higher than that of the agents born under the natural transition.
Figure 2.8 shows the results for aggregate capital stock, aggregate labour units,
and output. Despite not obvious on the graph, the aggregate capital stock, as
in equation (2.22), is slightly higher under the One-Child policy case before
1990. This is due to that agents whose fertility choices are restricted spent
less on children and save more. Later the natural transition path takes over
because of the larger population. The second panel in 2.8 shows the paths for
efficient labour units, calculated as in equation (2.21). After year 1995, the
efficient labour units under One-child policy is lower than that under natural
transition. In other words, even though the fertility policy increases human
capital per child, the aggregate human capital in the economy is lower. Hence
the output will eventually fall below the natural transition case, as shown in
the third panel. The model’s prediction suggests the negative effect of fertility
policy started to show in around year 2000.
These results suggest that despite there is a quality quantity trade-off on the
individual level, it does not exist on aggregate level. The increase in individual
human capital is unable to overturn the effect of a fertility decline.
This model’s prediction of fertility rate at 1.6 under natural transition sug-
gests that the current Two-children policy is not binding on average, if the
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cost of raising and educating children remains at its current level. The above
calibration takes education cost variations as exogenous. It is possible to the-
orize a situation where the increase in education price is actually the result
of a binding fertility policy. When parents are only allowed to have less than
their ideal number of children, they may be willing to pay a higher price for
a given amount of human capital goods. Similarly, when they give birth to
more children, parents are willing to pay less for the same human capital level,
because parents are paying for more children. If education price respond en-
dogenously respond to fertility, it is possible that the model under predicts the
counter-factual fertility rate.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I present an OLG model of fertility and human capital choice
in a framework with inter-generational transfer. I illustrate that when an ex-
ogenously binding fertility is imposed, agents choose the maximum fertility
allowed, and this leads to an increase in the human capital level and wage in-
come of the generations affected. To assess the effect on total income, I extend
the model to 16-period and calibrate the quantitative model. The calibra-
tion exercise shows that the One-child policy improves the human capital of
the generations born under the policy by around 30%. However, even though
it improves the individual human capital and income, its effect on total in-
come has turned negative. The increase in individual income cannot offset the
decline in fertility. This suggests that even though there is quantity quality
trade-off on the individual level, there is no quantity-quality trade-off on the
aggregate level. Based on this calibration exercise, the unconstrained fertility
is around 1.6 children per family given the current cost of raising and educat-
ing children. The relaxation of the One-child policy at the end of 2015 to a
Two-children policy is not binding.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Consumption and Saving in the Three Period Model
The consumption decisions of a young agent at time t:
cy,t =
1
1 + β
[(
1− ψn
ω−1
t−1
ω
− ntφf
)
wy,t − ntpE,tEt + ψn
ω
t
ω
wy,t+1
Rt+1
]
(2.26)
cm,t+1 =
βRt+1
1 + β
[(
1− ψn
ω−1
t−1
ω
− ntφf
)
wy,t − ntpE,tEt + ψn
ω
t
ω
wy,t+1
Rt+1
]
(2.27)
and the corresponding saving decisions is given by:
ay,t =
β
1 + β
[(
1− ψn
ω−1
t−1
ω
− ntφf
)
wy,t − ntpE,tEt
]
− 1
1 + β
ψnωt
ω
wy,t+1
Rt+1
(2.28)
2.6.2 Optimality Conditions of the Quantitative Model
The consumption decision of this agent is standard.
ct(5) = wt(5)
ct+1(6) =
1
10∑
i=0
βi
Wt+1(6)
ct+i(5 + i) = βRt+ict+i−i(4 + i), ∀i = 2, ..., 11
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where Wt+1(6) is given by:
Wt+1(6) =(1− nt+1φ6)wt+1(6) + (1− nt+1φ7)wt+2(7)
Rt+2
+
(
1− nt+1φ8 − ψn
ω−1
t−4
ω
)
wt+3(8)
Rt+2Rt+3
+
(
1− ψn
ω−1
t−4
ω
)
wt+4(9)− nt+1pt+4Et+4(4)
Rt+2Rt+3Rt+4
+
(
1− ψn
ω−1
t−4
ω
)
wt+5(10)− nt+1pt+5Et+5(5)
Rt+2Rt+3Rt+4Rt+5
+
(
1− ψn
ω−1
t−4
ω
)
wt+6(11)
Rt+2Rt+3Rt+4Rt+5Rt+6
+
wt+7(12)
Rt+2Rt+3Rt+4Rt+5Rt+6Rt+7
+
ψnωt+1
ω
wt+8(8)∏8
i=2 Rt+i
+
ψnωt+1
ω
wt+9(9)∏9
i=2Rt+i
+
ψnωt+1
ω
wt+10(10)∏10
i=2Rt+i
+
ψnωt+1
ω
wt+11(11)∏11
i=2Rt+i
The optimal choice of fertility:
υ
nt+1
+
β7
ct+8(13)
ψnω−1t+1 wt+8+
β8
ct+9(14)
ψnω−1t+1 wt+9+
β9
ct+10(15)
ψnω−1t+1 wt+10+
β10
ct+11(16)
ψnω−1t+1 wt+11
=
1
ct+1(6)
(
φ6wt+1(6) +
φ7wt+2(7)
Rt+2
+
φ8wt+3(8)
Rt+2Rt+3
+
pE,t+4Et+4(4)
Rt+2Rt+3Rt+4
+
pE,t+5Et+5(5)
Rt+2Rt+3Rt+4Rt+5
)
where the left hand side is marginal gain from an extra child and right hand
side is the marginal cost of raising another child.
The optimal choice of human capital spending in the fourth and fifth period
of children’s life is given by:
nt+1pE4,t+4(4) =
ψnωt+1
ω
∂ht+5
∂Et+4(4)
(
1
Rt+8...Rt+5
∂wt+8(8)
∂ht+5
+
1
Rt+9...Rt+5
∂wt+9(9)
∂ht+5
+
1
Rt+10...Rt+5
∂wt+10(10)
∂ht+5
1
Rt+11...Rt+5
∂wt+11(11)
∂ht+5
)
nt+1pE5,t+5(5) =
ψnωt+1
ω
∂ht+5
∂Et+5(5)
(
1
Rt+8...Rt+6
∂wt+8(8)
∂ht+5
+
1
Rt+9...Rt+6
∂wt+9(9)
∂ht+5
+
1
Rt+10...Rt+6
∂wt+10(10)
∂ht+5
1
Rt+11...Rt+6
∂wt+11(11)
∂ht+5
)
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2.6.3 Mincer Return
Table 2.4 shows the mincer regression from 1992 to 2009 using Urban House-
hold Survey Data.
Table 2.4: Mincer Return: 1992 to 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
yos 0.121*** 0.123*** 0.132*** 0.129*** 0.132*** 0.125***
(0.00231) (0.00250) (0.00249) (0.00247) (0.00244) (0.00260)
exp 0.0991*** 0.0916*** -0.000915 0.0817*** 0.0820*** 0.0870***
(0.00217) (0.00237) (0.000652) (0.00223) (0.00225) (0.00236)
exp2 -0.00169*** -0.00154*** -1.23e-07 -0.00130*** -0.00129*** -0.00138***
(3.47e-05) (3.66e-05) (4.14e-07) (3.54e-05) (3.59e-05) (3.77e-05)
Constant 7.018*** 6.895*** 7.917*** 6.665*** 6.525*** 6.437***
(0.0484) (0.0531) (0.0452) (0.0492) (0.0488) (0.0512)
Observations 24,940 25,323 26,765 26,341 25,958 25,168
R-squared 0.217 0.189 0.126 0.165 0.167 0.152
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998
yos 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.111*** 0.123*** 0.0947*** 0.0904***
(0.00265) (0.00276) (0.00459) (0.00413) (0.00390) (0.00367)
exp 0.0909*** 0.102*** 0.124*** 0.113*** 0.115*** 0.117***
(0.00238) (0.00249) (0.00401) (0.00350) (0.00327) (0.00302)
exp2 -0.00139*** -0.00162*** -0.00219*** -0.00187*** -0.00197*** -0.00198***
(3.84e-05) (4.01e-05) (6.76e-05) (5.90e-05) (5.45e-05) (4.96e-05)
Constant 6.169*** 6.031*** 6.043*** 5.895*** 6.194*** 6.142***
(0.0509) (0.0526) (0.0854) (0.0752) (0.0713) (0.0665)
Observations 23,256 21,332 9,093 9,177 9,710 9,996
R-squared 0.154 0.179 0.180 0.193 0.186 0.200
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992
yos 0.0845*** 0.0703*** 0.0659*** 0.0803*** 0.0584*** 0.0524***
(0.00358) (0.00328) (0.00319) (0.00321) (0.00272) (0.00242)
exp 0.119*** 0.121*** 0.120*** 0.119*** 0.116*** 0.113***
(0.00304) (0.00288) (0.00285) (0.00278) (0.00240) (0.00225)
exp2 -0.00200*** -0.00207*** -0.00208*** -0.00201*** -0.00196*** -0.00187***
(5.05e-05) (4.79e-05) (4.77e-05) (4.63e-05) (4.03e-05) (3.88e-05)
Constant 6.137*** 6.212*** 6.202*** 5.804*** 5.832*** 5.704***
(0.0643) (0.0593) (0.0576) (0.0575) (0.0486) (0.0435)
Observations 10,246 10,148 10,278 10,243 10,289 10,798
R-squared 0.187 0.200 0.199 0.209 0.221 0.214
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 .
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Figure 2.1: Fertility rate: rural and total
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Fe
rti
lit
y
Urban
Total
Note: Data from ?. Urban fertility is annual data from year 1960 to 2010. Total fertility is
for year 1962, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010.
Figure 2.2: Human capital and Physical capital conditions, given fertility
Note: β = 0.6; υ = 0.08; α = 0.52; gA = 1.3; φf = 0; Ah = 0.5; γ = 0.4; ψ = 0.2; ω = 0.65;
pE
wy
= 0.01
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Figure 2.3: Human capital and physical capital conditions, changing fertility
Note: β = 0.6; υ = 0.08; α = 0.52; gA = 1.3; φf = 0; Ah = 0.5; γ = 0.4; ψ = 0.2; ω = 0.65;
pE
wy
= 0.01
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Figure 2.4: Steady state fertility and human capital goods
Figure 2.5: Education Spending on Child: 1992 to 2009
Note: This is the average expenditure on education in Single-child household, divided by
household income. Data: Calculated from UHS.
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Figure 2.6: Education spending on One-child
Note: Data from UHS 2002 to 2009 average
Figure 2.7: fertility and human capital
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Figure 2.8: Aggregate changes
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Chapter 3
Information Technology, Input
Structure, and Inequality
3.1 Introduction
With the recent development in information technology, the transmission of
information has been made so much easier. In this paper, we analyze its
implications on the structure of intermediate input and wage inequality.
We obtain an information score for each occupation, based on the the level of
the skill of analyzing data or information needed in this occupation. We calcu-
late the weighted national average info score in 1980, and we group industries
into information (info) sector and non-information (non-info) sector based on
industry average information score. Industries with information score higher
than national average are classified into info sector and the rest are in the
non-info sector. Similarly, workers are grouped into info workers and non-info
workers. Those in occupations with information score higher than 1980 na-
tional average are info workers, and the rest are classified into non-info workers.
Based on this classification, we make two observations. The first is that over
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time, info goods, output of the info sector, accounts for a larger share in total
intermediate input, while non-info goods, output of the non-info sector, ac-
counts for a smaller share in total intermediate input. The second observation
is that wage rate of info labour over non-info labour is increasing over time,
controlling for other observables.
We interpret the development of information technology as the decline in the
transaction cost of info sector output. In a two sector model with an info sector
and a non-info sector, we assess if this decline can explain the observations on
the intermediate input structure and wage inequality. The model has two
goods, info good and non-info good. There are also two types of labour, info
labour and non-info labour. Production in both sectors require an aggregate
info input and an aggregate non-info input. The aggregate info input in each
sector is provided by info labour and market purchase of intermediate info
goods. Similarly, the aggregate non-info input is provided by non-info labour
and intermediate non-info goods.
In this framework, we show that with reasonable assumptions on the elastici-
ties, a decline in transaction cost of info good cannot simultaneously explain
the rise of info good share in intermediate input and the rise of relative wage
rate of info worker. Two elasticities are crucial in this framework. One is the
elasticity of substitution between the aggregate info input and the aggregate
non-info input. The other one is the elasticity of substitution between labour
and intermediate good for a given aggregate input.
Vaguely speaking, when transaction cost of info good falls, to generate an in-
crease in the share of info intermediate input, we need the elasticity of substi-
tution between aggregate info input and aggregate non-info input to be larger
than one. In other words, they need to be good substitutes. In this setting, it
is natural to assume that substituting between labour and intermediate goods
used to produce a given aggregate input is easier than substituting between the
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two aggregate inputs. If so, a decline in transaction cost of info good cannot
increase the relative wage rate of info worker. When transaction cost of info
good declines, both labour types benefit because it represents a technologi-
cal improvement. However, non-info labour benefits more, because compared
with info labour, non-info labour is less substitutable with info good. In a
summary, with these assumptions on elasticities, we can explain the increase
of info intermediate input share but not the increase of the relative wage rate
of info worker.
Our industry classification follows the BEA 15 sector classification, and the
only difference is that we take out the manufacturing of Computers and Elec-
tronic Services from the manufacturing sector to be an individual industry.
Based on this industry classification, those that are classified as info sector in-
cludes: Wholesale; Utilities; Finance, Insurance and Real Estate ; Professional
Business Service; Educational Services, Health Care and Social Assistance;
and Manufacturing of Computer and Electronic Products. This is similar
to the sector classification by Jorgenson et al. (2005) in that our info sector
largely corresponds to what he calls IT-producing and IT-using sector, and our
non-info sector is similar to what he calls non-IT using industries. Berlingieri
(2013) also notes the increasing importance of finance and professional business
service sector as intermediate input.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 presents the empirical motivations.
Section 3.3 presents a two sector model where sectors differ in labour intensity.
Section 3.4 calibrate the model and analyze the quantitative effects. Sections
3.5 concludes.
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3.2 Empirical Motivation
Data used in this section is from IPUMS ASEC CPS, BEA Input-output table
and O*Net database.
3.2.1 Information Score and Sector Classification
We make use of the question "Analyzing data or information" in the O*Net
data. It is one of the 41 questions on work activities asked for each occupa-
tion In the O*Net database V15.1. 1 For each question, an importance score
and a level score are reported. We use the level score which is reported on a
scale of 0 to 7. 2 A higher score indicates that a higher degree of a particu-
lar descriptor is required or needed to perform the occupation. We take the
reported score to be our occupation information score, and we calculate the
sector level information score as the weighted average of occupation informa-
tion score. The weights are occupation shares in each sector calculated from
the IPUMS CPS ASEC.3 We calculate an information score for each industry
based on a 16-industry classification. This classification is the same as the
BEA 15 aggregate sector classification, except for one difference; we take out
the manufacturing of Computer and Electronic Products (NAICS 334) and re-
1Among them, 14 questions has the word "information" in either the question or the
explanation of the question. Right now we use just one question, "analyzing data or in-
formation". See https://www.onetcenter.org/dl_files/MS_Word/Generalized_Work_
Activities.pdf for the details of the questions. Table 3.5 in appendix list these 14 ques-
tions
2 Acemoglu and Autor (2011) uses the importance score, but we feel the level score is
more appropriate for our purpose. The Onet website gives an example to explain the dif-
ference. See https://www.onetonline.org/help/online/scales#foot3. Speaking skill is
important to both lawyers and paralegals, but to become a lawyer, a higher level of speaking
skill is required. The level score and importance score has correlation 0.97.
3The occupation code in the O*Net data V15.1 is based on SOC2010 occupation code.
We link each SOC2010 occupation to occ2010 in the IPUMS data (with minor adjustment)
using this crosswalk: https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https:
//www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/demo/guidance/industry-occupation/
2010-occ-codes-with-crosswalk-from-2002-2011.xls
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gard it as an individual sector. 4 We then calculate the unweighted average of
industry information score, and we classify industries with information score
above this average as information sector, and those below as non-information
sector. Based on this classification, information sector includes Wholesale;
Utilities; Finance, Insurance and Real Estate; Professional Business Service;
Educational Services, Health Care and Social Assistance; and Manufacturing:
Computer and Electronic Products. The rest is classified into non-information
sector. The information score for each industry in 1980 is reported in Table
3.6 in the Appendix 3.6.25.
3.2.2 Intermediate Input Share
Based on the sector classification, we present the changes in intermediate input
structure. In both info and non-info sector, the share of info goods in total
intermediate increases, and the share of non-info goods declines, shown in
Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 respectively. These figures also indicate that the
share of total intermediate input in each sector is relatively stable.
Figure 3.3 plots the ratio of info intermediate input over non-info intermediate
input in each sector. This ratio increases more in info sector.
3.2.3 Returns to Info Labour
First we show that returns to occupations with higher information score has
been increasing overtime. For each occupation, we calculate its mean real
4The industries are: 1 Agriculture; 2 Mining; 3 Utilities; 4 Construction; 5 Manufac-
turing, excluding Computer and Electronic Products ; 6 Wholesale trade; 7 Retail trade; 8
Transportation and Warehousing; 9 Information ; 10 FIRE; 11 PBS; 12 Educational Services,
Health Care and Social Assistance; 13 Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommodation
and Food Services; 14 Other services, except Government; 15 Manufacturing: Computer
and Electronic Products, 16 Government. We ignore the government sector.
5Based on this classification, industry 9, the Information industry is classified into non-
info sector.
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Table 3.1: Regression on Information Score
log hourly wage 1980 1990 2000 2010
info score 0.0935*** 0.121*** 0.141*** 0.166***
(0.00322) (0.00289) (0.00322) (0.00272)
Constant -3.187*** -3.202*** -3.149*** -2.959***
(0.0643) (0.0542) (0.0747) (0.0707)
Race Dummy YES YES YES YES
Educ Dummy YES YES YES YES
Sex Dummy YES YES YES YES
years of experience YES YES YES YES
experience square YES YES YES YES
Observations 42,146 41,454 36,344 50,383
R-squared 0.209 0.263 0.283 0.319
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
hourly wage by year. Figure 3.4 shows the scatter plot for 1980, 1990, 2000
and 2010. We also fit a linear line for each year, and for ease of comparison,
Figure 3.5 summarizes all four lines on the same graph. Clearly the lines are
become steeper over time, indicating higher returns to occupations with higher
information score.
To show this more formally, we regress the log real hourly income on informa-
tion score and other control variables. Table 3.1 summarizes the results. The
coefficient on information score is increasing over time.
In section 3.6.3 in the Appendix, we show a comparison of the measure used
here and the ones proposed by Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
To better match the model in Section 3.3, we can also group workers into
info and non-info worker and calculate the relative wage rate. We use the
same threshold as the one we used for sector classification. All workers in
occupations with information score higher than national average are classified
as info workers, and all workers in occupations with score lower than that are
classified as non-info workers. Figure 3.6 shows the results. It is increasing
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over time until around 2008.
3.3 Model
In this section, we present a two-sector model. Assume there are info sector I
and non-info sector N . In each sector, production requires both info input and
non-info input. Info input can be produced using info labour and info sector
output. Similarly, non-info input can be produced using non-info labour and
non-info sector output. Production function has the following form:
Qj = Aj
((AjjLjj)σ1−1σ1 + (Mjj
λjj
)σ1−1
σ1
) σ1
σ1−1
σ2−1
σ2
+
(
(Aj,−jLj,−j)
σ1−1
σ1 +
(
Mj,−j
λj,−j
)σ1−1
σ1
) σ1
σ1−1
σ2−1
σ2

σ2
σ2−1
(3.1)
where Qi and Aj are the output and aggregate productivity of sector j, j ∈
{I,N}. When j = N , then −j = I, and vice versa. Aj,j and Aj,−j are the
labour productivity of type j and type −j labour working in sector j. Lj,j
and Lj,−j are type j and type −j labour employed in sector j. Mj,j and Mj,−j
are the intermediate inputs that sector j purchases from sector j and sector
−j , and λjj and λj,−j represent the transaction costs incurred when sector j
uses intermediate inputs from sector j and sector −j. σ2 is the elasticity of
substitution between the aggregate info input and aggregate non-info input,
and σ1 is the elasticity of substitution between labour and intermediate input.
When σ2 > 1, aggregate info input and aggregate non-info input are good
substitutes.
There are two types of homogeneous labour: a measure SI of info worker and a
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measure SN of non-info worker. Workers receive wage payment and consume.
They have the following preference over info and non-info goods:
C =
[
ζC
−1

N + (1− ζ)C
−1

I
] 
−1
(3.2)
and the corresponding price index is given by:
P =
[
ζP 1−N + (1− ζ) P 1−I
] 1
1− (3.3)
3.3.1 Optimality Conditions
Each sector maximizes the following problem:
max
Lj,j ,Lj,−j ,M−j
PjQj −WjLj,j −W−jLj,−j − PjMj,j − P−jMj,−j
where Pj refers to the price of sector j output. Wj and W−j are the wage rates
of type j and type −j labour. The first order conditions for sector’s optimal
input is summarized in Appendix 3.6.4.
The consumers maximizes the following aggregate consumption, subject to
their total wage income. The problem is written as:
Max
CN ,CI
C =
[
ζC
−1

N + (1− ζ)C
−1

I
] 
−1
subject to PNCN + PICI = SNWN + SIWI (3.4)
The optimal consumption decision satisfies:
PICI
PNCN
= (
1− ζ
ζ
)(
PI
PN
)1− (3.5)
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3.3.2 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, goods market must clear, and hence:
Qj = Cj +Mj,j +M−j,j; j ∈ I,N (3.6)
Labour market satisfies:
SN = LIN + LNN ; SI = LNI + LII ; (3.7)
In a summary, the equilibrium satisfies the first order conditions, equation
(3.10) to equation (3.17), production functions as in equation (3.1), the opti-
mal consumption decision and budge constraint, equation (3.5) and (3.4), the
labour market and goods market clearing conditions, equation (3.6) and (3.7)
and the aggregate the price index equation (3.3) with P = 1.
3.3.3 Effects of a Fall in Transaction Cost of Info Good
We interpret a fall in transaction cost of info goods as a simultaneous fall
in both λII and λNI by the same percentage. This is similar to a decrease
in iceberg cost. We can write the marginal product of info labour over the
marginal product of on-info labour in info sector as:
MPII
MPIN
=
 (AIILII)
σ1−1
σ1 +
(
MII
λII
)σ1−1
σ1
(AINLIN)
σ1−1
σ1 +
(
MIN
λIN
)σ1−1
σ1

σ2−σ1
(σ1−1)σ2 (
AII
AIN
)σ1−1
σ1
(
LII
LIN
)−1
σ1
(3.8)
The direct effect of a fall in λII on relative marginal productivity, holding
labour allocation and intermediate input constant, depends on the sign of σ2−
σ1. If 0 < σ1 < σ2, then a fall in a fall in λII increase the relative productivity
of info worker. If σ1 > σ2 > 0, then it decreases the relative productivity of
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info worker. This is intuitive, when σ1 > σ2 > 0, the substitution between
labour and intermediate input in the production of a given aggregate input
is easier than the substitution between two types of aggregate input. This
means that info intermediate input is more substitutable with info labour and
non-info labour, and hence, the type of labour that is less substitutable with
intermediate info input benefits more. I used the info sector as an illustration,
but it is the same with the non-info sector.
What happens to the overall substitution between intermediate info and in-
termediate non-info will depend on σ2, which determines the substitutability
between aggregate info input and aggregate non-info input. Manipulating the
first order conditions, we can write the nominal relative intermediate input in
info sector as:
PIMII
PNMIN
=
(
PIλII
PNλIN
)1−σ2
(
PIλII
WI
AII
)σ1−1
+ 1(
PNλIN
WN
AIN
)σ1−1
+ 1

σ2−σ1
σ1−1
(3.9)
Without the second term on the right hand side, this equation is the same as
the expenditure share derived from a standard CES function. In that case, with
σ2 > 1, holding prices constant, a fall in λII lead to a higher info intermediate
input share. With a reasonable assumption of σ2 < σ1, the second term
predicts the same qualitative results as the first term.
In a summary, to generate the rising of info intermediate input share when
transaction costs fall, we need σ2 to be greater than one, and together with a
reasonable assumption of σ2 < σ1, this model will generate an increase in the
info intermediate share, but will lead to a decline of the relative wage rate of
info worker.
Of course the above discussion above is based on partial equilibrium. In Section
3.4, we numerically solve the model and discuss the results under general
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equilibrium.
Bofore moving to the quantitative result, there is another point worth men-
tioning. Despite that our focus is on the decline of transaction cost of info
good, a simultaneous fall in λII and λNI , an increase of AI has similar effects6.
Intuitively, AI is making info sector more productive, in both the production
of consumption info good and intermediate info good, while a decline in trans-
action cost of info good represents an increase in productivity of info sector
in producing intermediate input, not consumption good. This is because we
assume the transaction costs appears when a good is used as intermediate in-
put, not when it is consumed. If we were to assume that the same transaction
cost also applies when a good is consumed, then an increase info sector’s pro-
ductivity AI will have the same effects as the fall of transaction cost λNI and
λII .
3.4 Quantitative Results
3.4.1 Parameter Calibration
In this section, I first discuss how other parameters are calibrated for a given
pair of elasticities σ1 and σ2. We normalize both AI and AN to be 1.
We calibrate the parameters in consumption CES in equation (3.2) using the
relative price PI
PN
calculated from US KLEMS data and the consumption share
PICI
PNCN
calculated from BEA data.7
The other parameters are calibrated to match certain moments in the 1980
data. We treat all workers in occupations with information score lower than
6We show in Appendix 3.6.5 that AI actually increase less than AN
7We regress the log first difference version of equation 3.5 and get a  value of about 0.9.
Then we back out the ζ using yearly data. Each year gives a different ζ, and it suggest that
ζ is declining over time. In other words, consumers increasingly prefer info goods over time.
However, in the baseline, we set ζ = 0.6.
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the national average in 1980 as non-info worker, and workers in occupations
with information score higher than national average as info workers. The 1980
CPS data implies that total hours supplied by info worker relative to that
of non-info worker is 0.8196. We normalize the supply of non-info labour to
be one, SN = 1, hence the supply of of info labour is SI = 0.8196. Also,
about 50.91% of the total info hours is supplied to non-info sector and the
rest to info sector. Together with the homogenous labour assumptions, we get
LNI = 0.5091SI , and LII = 0.4909SI . For non-info hours, 74.49% is supplied
to non-info sector. Thus LNN = 0.7449SN , and LIN = 0.2551SN .
The average hourly wage rate of an info worker relative to that of an non-info
worker calculated from 1980 data is WI
WN
= 1.4893. 8
The intermediate input presented in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 is divided by
gross GDP, and it includes capital. Our model does not have capital, We
also need to to exclude the share of capital. Using KLEMS data to calculate
capital share, we can calculate the intermediate shares PIMNI
PNQN
, PNMNN
PNQN
, PNMIN
PIQI
and PIMII
PIQI
.
Since we also observe the labour allocation and relative wage rate, we can also
work out WILII
PIQI
, WNLIN
PIQI
, WILNI
PNQN
, and WNLNN
PNQN
.
With the labour inputs and intermediate share given, we can calculate the
implied nominal consumption share PICI
PNCN
. Then by equation (3.5), we find
the relative price PI
PN
that is consistent with this relative nominal consumption.
Together with the aggregate price index equation (3.3), it solves PI and PN .
Finally the last set of parameters to be identified are the productivities AI and
AN , the transaction cost λII , λIN , λNI and λNN . These can be backed out
from the first order conditions, equation (3.10) to equation (3.17), given that
we now have all the input allocations.
8The sector level relative wage rate differ in two sectors. Given our homogenous labour
assumption, we cannot, at the same time, match the relative wage rate of both sectors.
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Table 3.2: Parameters: σ1 > σ2 > 1
Exogenously Set Parameters
σ1 1.5
σ2 1.2
Normalization
AI 1 normalization
AN 1 normalization
AII 1 normalization
sN 1 normalization
Calibrated Parameters
 0.9 consumption data
ζ 0.6 consumption data
sI 0.8196 hours worked by info and non-info workers
AIN 0.3673 labour allocation and intermediate input share
λII 4.4483 labour allocation and intermediate input share
λIN 5.7742 labour allocation and intermediate input share
ANI 0.4007 labour allocation and intermediate input share
ANN 0.8476 labour allocation and intermediate input share
λNI 11.2401 labour allocation and intermediate input share
λNN 2.4587 labour allocation and intermediate input share
3.4.2 Case 1: σ1 > σ2 > 1
In this case, we look at the case where the aggregate info input and aggregate
non-info input are good substitutes σ2 > 1, and that substitution between
labour and intermediate input is easier than substitution between two aggre-
gate input σ1 > σ2. Table 3.2 summarizes the parameter values. All other
parameters are calibrated following the steps described in Section 3.4.1.
We look at both the increase of info sector productivity AI and fall in trans-
action costs λII and λNI . The results are presented in Model 2 and Model 3
in Table 3.3. In both Model 2 and Model 3, the relative price of info good
declines, the relative wage rate of info worker declines, and both sectors use
more info input than non-info input. Model 3 makes it clear that with rea-
sonable assumptions on the elasticities, the decline in transaction cost of info
goods can explain the increase in the usage of info intermediate input, but not
126
Table 3.3: Model results: σ1 > σ2 > 1
Case 1 Data Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
σ1 = 1.5, σ2 = 1.2 1980 Baseline AI ↑ λˆII ↓, λˆNI ↓
PI/PN 1.2096 0.9704 1.1768
WI/WN 1.4893 1.4893 1.4633 1.4704
(PIMII)/(PNMIN) 0.8580 0.8580 0.9429 0.9400
(PIMNI)/(PNMNN) 0.2914 0.2914 0.3206 0.3196
Note: These data moments are are direct targets, so naturally the baseline case matches
them exactly. Model 2 represent a 20% increase in AI relative to the baseline case, meaning
AnewI = 1.2A
old
I . Model 3 represents a fall in λII and λNI. λ
new
II =
(
1
1.2
)σ1−1
σ1 λoldII and
λnewNI =
(
1
1.2
)σ1−1
σ1 λoldNI .
the relative wage rate change.
3.4.3 Case 2 : σ2 < 1 and σ1 > σ2
In the above case, we assume that aggregate info input and non-info aggregate
input are good substitutes σ1 > 1, I now show examples where aggregate info
input and non-info input are not good substitutes, σ1 < 1. We follow the
same steps described in Section 3.4.1 in calibrating the other parameters. For
this reason, in Table 3.4, both Case 2A and Case 2B have the same baseline
results as Case 1. Case 2A is the case where labour and intermediate input
is bad substitute with σ1 < 1 , and Case 2B is the case where they are good
substitutes with σ1 > 1 .
In both case 2A and 2B, a fall in the transaction cost leads to a lower relative
wage rate and a lower ratio of info intermediate over non-info intermediate.
Similar as before, the lower relative wage rate is because of the assumption
σ1 > σ2, and the lower ratio of info intermediate over non-info intermediate is
due to the low elasticity of substitution between aggregate info and aggregate
non-info input.
As these cases demonstrate, the elasticity parameters σ1 and σ2 are crucial in
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Table 3.4: Model results: σ2 < 1 and σ1 > σ2
Case 2A Model 2 Model 3
σ1 = 0.9, σ2 = 0.8 Baseline AI ↑ λˆII ↓, λˆNI ↓
PI/PN 1.2096 0.9757 1.1790
WI/WN 1.4893 1.4693 1.4735
(PIMII)/(PNMIN) 0.8580 0.8393 0.8399
(PIMNI)/(PNMNN) 0.2914 0.2850 0.2852
Case 2B Model 2 Model 3
σ1 = 1.2, σ2 = 0.8 Baseline AI ↑ λˆII ↓, λˆNI ↓
PI/PN 1.2096 0.9658 1.1689
WI/WN 1.4893 1.4191 1.4340
(PIMII)/(PNMIN) 0.8580 0.8894 0.8885
(PIMNI)/(PNMNN) 0.2914 0.3022 0.3018
Note: Model 2 in both cases represents a 20% increase in AI relative to the baseline case,
meaning AnewI = 1.2A
old
I . Model 3 in both cases represents a fall in λII and λNI. λ
new
II =(
1
1.2
)σ1−1
σ1 λoldII and λ
new
NI =
(
1
1.2
)σ1−1
σ1 λoldNI .
As illustrated in table
determining whether we can explain the two facts with a decline in transaction
cost of info good. A σ1 greater than one is required to generate the substitution
between info and non-info intermediate input. However, a natural assumption
that σ2 is less than σ1 imply that the relative wage rate of info worker falls
when with a decline in transaction cost.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we first present two facts from the data. One is the increase in
share of info goods in total intermediate input, and the second one is the rise
in return to info worker. We ask if it these two facts can be explained by a
decline in transaction costs of info good. We build a two sector model, and we
show that with reasonable assumptions on the elasticities, a decline in cost of
transaction of the info good cannot explain these two facts at the same time.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 14 Questions Related to Information
Table 3.5 lists the 14 questions that have the word information in either the
question itself or question explanatory notes.
3.6.2 Information Score by Industry
The information score presented in Table 3.6 is based on the level score to the
question "Analyzing data or information".
3.6.3 Comparisons with Existing Measures
Our measure of occupation information score is very similar to Acemoglu and
Autor (2011)’s measure of non-routine cognitive analytical ability. They create
five measures, non-routine cognitive analytical, non-routine interpersonal, rou-
tine cognitive, routine manual and non-routine manual. Table 3.7 summarizes
them. Top panel shows they have two extra questions in their non-routine
cognitive analytical skill measure, apart from analyzing data and information.
To see which of the five measures better explain wage variations, we calculate
the partial R2 values (net of experience, education, gender and race) using each
of the 5 task measures and using all five measures in combination. Left panel
of Figure 3.7 reports R2 value from the residual wage dispersion regressions.
The explanatory power of 4 out of 5 task measures rise from late 1980s, and it
increases most for non-routine analytical task increases. In fact the increase in
the R2 of the regression using all 5 task measures together is driven by the non-
routine analytical measure alone. Starting from late 1980s, the explanatory
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Table 3.5: 14 "information" related question
Number Work activity Explanation
1 Getting Information Observing, receiving, and oth-
erwise obtaining information
from all relevant sources.
2 Identifying Objects, Actions,
and Events
Identifying information by cat-
egorizing, estimating, recogniz-
ing differences or similarities,
and detecting changes in cir-
cumstances or events.
3 Monitoring Processes, Materi-
als, or Surroundings
Monitoring and reviewing infor-
mation from materials, events,
or the environment to detect or
assess problems
4 Estimating the Quantifiable
Characteristics of Products,
Events, or Information
Estimating sizes, distances, and
quantities; or determining time,
costs, resources, or materials
needed to perform a work ac-
tivity
5 Evaluating Information to De-
termine Compliance with Stan-
dards
Using relevant information and
individual judgment to deter-
mine whether events or pro-
cesses comply with laws, regu-
lations,or standards.
6 Processing Information Compiling, coding, categoriz-
ing, calculating, tabulating, au-
diting, or verifying information
or data.
7 Analyzing Data or Information Identifying the underlying prin-
ciples,reasons, or facts of infor-
mation by breaking down in-
formation or data into separate
parts
8 Making Decisions and Solving
Problems
Analyzing information and
evaluating results to choose
the best solution and solve
problems.
9 Working with Computers Using computers and computer
systems (including hardware
and software) to program, write
software, set up functions, enter
data, or process information.
10 Documenting/Recording Infor-
mation
Entering, transcribing, record-
ing, storing,or maintaining in-
formation in written or elec-
tronic/magnetic form.
11 Interpreting the Meaning of In-
formation for Others
Translating or explaining what
information means and how it
can be used
12 Communicating with Supervi-
sors, Peers, or Subordinates
Providing information to super-
visors, coworkers, and subordi-
nates by telephone, in written
form, e-mail, or in person.
13 Communicating with People
Outside the Organization
Communicating with people
outside the organization, rep-
resenting the organization to
customers, the public, gov-
ernment, and other external
sources. This information can
be exchanged in person, in writ-
ing, or by telephone or e-mail.
14 Performing Administrative Ac-
tivities
Performing day-to-day admin-
istrative tasks such as main-
taining information files and
processing paperwork.
Note: This table shows the 14 questions on work activities that have the word "information"
in either the question or question explanation.
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Table 3.6: Sector Information Score: 1980
Industry Score Average
1. Agriculture 2.41 3.23
2. Mining 3.07 3.23
3. Utilities 3.59 3.23
4. Construction 3.03 3.23
5. Manufacture, excluding Computer and Electronic Products 3.06 3.23
6. Wholesale Trade 3.47 3.23
7. Retail Trade 3.16 3.23
8. Transportation and Warehousing; 3.10 3.23
9. Information 3.20 3.23
10. Finance, Insurance, Real Estate; 3.66 3.23
11. Professional Business Service 3.79 3.23
12. Educational Services, Health Care and Social Assistance 3.51 3.23
13. Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommodation and Food Services 2.60 3.23
14. Other Services, except Government 3.01 3.23
15. Manufacture: Computer and Electronic Products 3.60 3.23
Note: Numbers are rounded to two digits. We ignore the government sector. Both industry
scores and average score are weighted by the corresponding occupation share, with weights
calculated from IPUMS CPS ASEC. I use the weighted associated with individual multiplied
by hours worked. We can also do this by pooling all years together and results are similar.
One exception is Sector 2: mining. In 1980, its info score is lower than average, but in 2010,
its info score has exceeded the average of that year.
power of other 4 task measures vanishes.
On the right panel we compare the residual R2 of the non-routine cognitive
analytic measure with the information intensity we use, which is the question
on "analyzing information and data". They tack each other closely, confirming
that the analyzing data or information is the most relevant task measure in
explaining wage dispersions, at least among the measures looked in this section.
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Table 3.7: Task measures by Acemoglu and Autor (2011)
Non-routine analytical
Analyze data/information
Think creatively
Interpret information for others
Non-routine interpersonal
Establish/maintain personal relationships
Guide/direct/motivate subordinates
Coach/develop others
Routine cognitive
Importance of repeating the same tasks
Importance of being exact or accurate
Structured v. Unstructured work (reverse)
Routine manual
Control machines and processes
Spend time making repetitive motions
Spend time making repetitive motions
Non-Routine manual
Operate vehicles/mechanized devices
Use hand to handle objects/tools
Manual dexterity
Spatial orientation
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3.6.4 Optimal Input Conditions
The optimality conditions of the sector optimization problem pretend in Sec-
tion 3.3.1 are:
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3.6.5 Sector Productivity Change
Figure 3.8 plot the productivity of info and non-info sector calculated from the
data. Data show that over time AI increase less than AN .
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Figure 3.1: Intermediate input used by info sector
Data: BEA Input-Output table. Intermediate inputs are divided by sector nominal GDP.
Figure 3.2: Intermediate input used by non-info sector
Data: BEA Input-Output table. Intermediate inputs are divided by sector nominal GDP.
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Figure 3.3: Info intermediate input over non-info intermediate input
Data: BEA Input-Output table. This figure plots the intermediate info input over interme-
diate non-info input used by each sector.
Figure 3.4: real wage and information score
Data: CPS ASEC from IPUMS. Real hourly wage is the occupation mean.
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Figure 3.5: real wage and information score
Data: CPS ASEC from IPUMS
Figure 3.6: real wage and information score
Data: CPS ASEC from IPUMS. Real hourly wage is the occupation mean.
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Figure 3.7: Partial R2 net of experience, education, race and gender
Data: IPUMS CPS ASEC and O*Net. The partial R2 values presented above are calculated
as follows: Regress Log hourly wages on a quartic in experience, and dummies of race, gender
and education. The residual log hourly wages are regressed separately on the variable groups
of interest. R2 from each regression is plotted above for each year. Both panels plot the
results for the all task measures used in ?.
Figure 3.8: AI and AN over time
Data: We compute AI and AN using March 2017 release world KLEMS available at http:
//www.worldklems.net/data.htm. For each industry, we calculate productivity growth as
lnAst − lnAst−1 = lnQst − lnQst−1 − 0.5(ΘK,st + ΘK,st−1)(lnKst − lnKst−1)− 0.5(ΘL,st +
ΘL,st−1)(lnLst− lnLst−1)−0.5(ΘM,st+ΘM,st−1)(lnMst− lnMst−1) where Θi,st is the factor
share of input i = K,L,M for industry s at year t. We normalize productivities in all
industries to be unity in 1980, and then we aggregate the industry level productivities into
two aggregate sector productivities, using the gross output share of each individual industry
such that lnAjt =
∑
s∈j
Gross Outputst
Gross Outputjt
lnAst, j ∈ I,N .
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